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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates how control features influence employees’ perceptions of controls 
and, subsequently, their reporting behaviors. I examine whether implementing a more centralized 
versus decentralized monitoring control influences employees’ perceptions of whether the 
control will detect misreporting. In an experiment that holds the true detection rate constant, I 
find that participants perceive a relatively decentralized control as more likely to detect 
misreporting than a centralized control. Because decisions about monitoring controls and 
compensation systems are interrelated (O’Donnell 2000) and made contemporaneously (Brenner 
and Ambos 2013), I also examine whether compensation interdependence influences the effect 
that control centralization has on misreporting. Prior research shows that compensation 
interdependence leads to more aggressive reporting behavior (Sutter 2009). This aggressive 
reporting behavior is likely to reduce sensitivity to differences in subjective assessment of a 
control’s detection likelihood resulting from control centralization. Consistent with this 
reasoning, I find that the difference in the extent of performance misreporting between a 
centralized and decentralized control is greater when compensation interdependence is low than 
when compensation interdependence is high. This study contributes to the accounting literature 
by defining control centralization and providing the first academic research on a consequence of 
control centralization. Moreover, this study provides theory and evidence of the joint influence 
of control centralization and compensation interdependence on misreporting, and it provides 
evidence that control design choices can influence employees’ perceptions of control 
effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Within an organizational hierarchy, performance information often flows from lower 
levels of the hierarchy to higher levels. For example, division managers in large firms report 
their division’s performance to corporate managers. Similarly, some lower-level employees, such 
as staff consultants, self-report their hourly performance to their superiors. Reporting employees 
have both the opportunity and incentive to misreport their true performance. Opportunity arises 
from the inherent information asymmetry between reporting employees and their managers 
(Rajan and Saouma 2006), while incentives exist because superiors use reported information for 
compensation and/or promotion decisions (Guidry et al. 1999) as well as internal resource 
allocation (Heinle et al. 2014). To combat misreporting, firms develop and implement controls 
designed to detect performance misreporting (Baiman and Demski 1980; Morton 1993).  
This study examines how two features of a control system jointly influence employees’ 
propensities to misreport their performance. One feature is the centralization of a monitoring 
control. Control centralization is defined as the extent to which a control is consolidated and 
coordinated within a firm (Anderson et al. 2010). The centralization of a control is determined by 
the states of several components of the control, such as the social distance between an employee 
and the control personnel, the standardization of the control within the firm and, importantly, the 
proximity between the reporting employee and the control itself, which varies cross-sectionally 
among firms. Specifically, a survey by Ernst & Young (2012) finds that 49 percent of firms have 
their internal audit function centralized in one location while the remaining 51 percent use a 
more dispersed, decentralized internal audit function. The report also highlights several control 
centralization determinants, including geographic dispersion and organizational structure, which 
results in the cross-sectional variation. However, the consequences of control centralization have 
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received little to no attention. Knowing the consequences of control centralization is critical to 
understanding how managers’ choices related to the different components of control 
centralization influence employees’ perception of control effectiveness. 
The second feature is the extent to which compensation is interdependent. That is, to 
what degree compensation is contingent upon group-based as opposed to individual-based 
performance. For example, bonuses contingent upon division performance have relatively high 
interdependence, while individual bonuses have relatively low interdependence (Lazear and 
Shaw 2007). Recent studies examine the direct effect that compensation interdependence can 
have on misreporting and generally find greater compensation interdependence leads to greater 
misreporting (Church et al. 2012; Maas and Van Rinsum 2013). However, these studies do not 
document how compensation interdependence influences the effectiveness of other controls 
designed to detect misreporting. This is important to consider because firms do not implement 
compensation-related controls in isolation, rather, they implement these controls within a more 
general control structure. As Grabner and Moers (2013) point out, “if an organization does not 
take the interdependencies among MC [management control] practices into account, it will 
forego some benefits or incur some unnecessary costs (p. 409).  
I focus on the joint effect of control centralization and compensation interdependence for 
three reasons. Decisions about monitoring mechanisms and compensation systems are 
interrelated (O’Donnell 2000) and often made contemporaneously (Brenner and Ambos 2013). 
Also, both formal monitoring and compensation design are two controls used by large, 
multinational firms to manage foreign subsidiaries (O’Donnell 2000; Roth and O’Donnell 1996). 
Additionally, the determinants of control centralization, such as business structure, cost, and 
geographic diversity (Ernst & Young 2012) are also determinants of compensation design within 
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foreign subsidiaries (Govindarajan 1988; Roth and O’Donnell 1996). These findings highlight 
that firms are likely to make control centralization and compensation interdependence decisions 
concurrently and these decisions play a vital role in how a firm attempts to influence employee 
behavior, especially in large, multinational firms.   
I rely on psychological distance theory to make my first prediction. Psychological 
distance is a subjective feeling of an object or event being close to, or far from, oneself (Magee 
and Smith 2013). Differences in psychological distance influence individuals’ perceptions of an 
event, including its likelihood of occurrence (Trope and Liberman 2010). Specifically, events 
physically, temporally, or socially closer to an individual are perceived as more likely to occur 
than events farther from an individual (Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007). In line with this 
theory, I predict that greater control centralization increases performance misreporting by 
decreasing employees’ perceptions that the control will detect misreported performance. I also 
predict that compensation interdependence will moderate this effect. Prior research shows that 
compensation interdependence increases risky decision-making (Sutter 2009), suggesting a 
larger increase in perceived detection rate is required to reduce dishonest reporting with 
interdependent compensation. Put another way, the fixed change in perceived detection 
likelihood resulting from control centralization will have less of an effect on misreporting when 
compensation interdependence is high versus low. Therefore, I predict that higher compensation 
interdependence moderates the effect that control centralization has on misreporting. 
To test these predictions, I use a 2 x 2 (between subjects) x 6 (within subjects) mixed 
experiment design. Participants assume the role of an employee making a reporting decision to a 
superior. In each of six rounds, participants privately receive the actual revenue of a project and 
then have the option to over-report the revenue to increase their compensation. After each 
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reporting decision, a review process takes place, operationalizing an investigation of the 
difference between participants’ reported and actual revenues. Participants are unaware of the 
true detection likelihood of this review, but they are able to assess it subjectively. If the review 
process detects misreporting, the participant loses his or her compensation for the round. I 
manipulate the location of the review process at two levels between subjects: Near Review (i.e., 
decentralized control) and Far Review (i.e., centralized control). I also manipulate the extent of 
compensation interdependence at two levels between subjects: High CI and Low CI. 
 Results of my experiment support the prediction that control centralization influences 
misreporting through employees’ subjective assessments that the control will detect misreported 
performance. Although true detection likelihood is consistent across conditions, participants in 
the Near Review condition assess a higher detection likelihood than participants in the Far 
Review condition, independent of compensation interdependence. However, compensation 
interdependence moderates the extent to which subjective detection likelihood influences 
reporting behavior. Specifically, given low compensation interdependence, less misreporting 
occurs with a decentralized control than with a centralized control. However, when 
compensation interdependence is high, participants misreport to the same degree, regardless of 
the assessed detection likelihood driven by control centralization. 
 Additional analyses indicate that participants’ perceptions of other participants’ 
misreporting also influences reporting behavior. When compensation interdependence is low, 
participants perceive other participants are more likely to misreport with a centralized control 
than with a decentralized control and increase their own misreporting. However, when 
compensation interdependence is high, control centralization has no effect on the perception that 
other participants are misreporting. These findings suggest that control centralization and 
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compensation interdependence jointly influence descriptive norms (i.e., perceptions of others’ 
behavior), another mechanism that influences reporting behavior. 
This study contributes to the accounting literature by offering theory and evidence about 
the interaction among controls and their joint influence on reporting behavior. While prior 
literature identifies the direct effect that compensation interdependence has on misreporting 
(Church et al. 2012; Maas and Van Rinsum 2013), my study contributes by highlighting a 
moderating effect. This moderating effect is important because it suggests that compensation 
interdependence can reduce the effectiveness of controls designed in part to reduce misreporting. 
In addition to documenting this moderating effect, this study also provides evidence of the 
cognitive processes underlying why it occurs. Specifically, this study provides a glimpse into 
how perceptions about a control itself and perceptions about how others respond to a control 
underlie the moderating effect. Practitioners, including designers of control systems and 
compensation systems, can leverage this study when implementing controls. In particular, these 
parties can consider the behavioral effect of control centralization on reporting behavior and can 
consider that greater compensation interdependence will mute this effect.  
This study also examines one consequence of control centralization. While there is some 
understanding of the determinants of control centralization decisions (Ernst & Young 2012), 
there is little research on whether control centralization can influence behavior. This study 
documents that control centralization decisions can influence misreporting, which suggests that 
future research examining behavioral consequences of control centralization could be beneficial.  
Finally, this study contributes to control literature by examining how features of two 
controls interact. Understanding one control’s influence on another advances our understanding 
of how a control system holistically helps a firm meet its objectives. This study provides an 
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example of one control feature, compensation interdependence, which can reduce the 
effectiveness of another control feature, centralization, in changing reporting behavior. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS OF PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
2.1 Overview of Literature Review 
 
The intent of this literature review is to summarize prior research related to my 
dissertation topic and to highlight unanswered research questions that either I explore within this 
dissertation or others can explore with future research. I format the literature review as follows: I 
first summarize research related to dishonest reporting, my dependent variable of interest. Since 
both my independent variables are control design choices, I then summarize research related to 
control systems. Finally, I discuss research that has examined the effects that physical distance 
between a person and an object can have on a person’s perception of an object. I review this 
stream of literature because the operationalization of one of my independent variables, control 
centralization, involves the physical distance between a control and an employee. 
2.2 Literature on Dishonest Reporting through Budgetary Slack 
 
 A prevalent setting within accounting to study misreporting is participative budgeting. 
Many firms have a budgeting process that involves some level of subordinate participation 
(Shields and Shields 1998). Participative budgets typically involve divisional mangers requesting 
necessary funds and the firm allocating resources based on those requests. One of the difficulties 
associated with participative budgeting is the propensity for managers to over-report the amount 
of funds required for their division (Onsi 1973). Specifically, managers have incentives to build 
slack into their budgetary requests. 
 Early literature examines the determinants of budgetary slack with mixed results. 
Merchant (1985) finds that the propensity to create slack is low when managers actively 
participate in budgeting, especially when the administrative system is relatively stable. However, 
Young (1985) finds that managerial participation increases budgetary slack. Interestingly, Young 
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(1985) also finds that the average amount of budgetary slack is no different for those participants 
who have private information about productive capabilities versus those who do not have private 
information. This suggests that information asymmetry is not a significant determinant of 
budgetary of slack. However, subsequent research suggests that information asymmetry is a 
significant predictor of budgetary slack (Dunk 1993).  
 Early research also examines whether individual preferences are determinants of slack. 
Young (1985) finds that risk preferences influence slack creation such that risk-averse 
subordinates build more slack into budgets than non-risk-averse subordinates do. Building on 
this study, Kim (1992) shows that environmental factors can influence risk preferences and 
budgetary slack. Specifically, Kim (1992) finds that previous exposure to missing (meeting) a 
budgetary goal can change an individual’s risk preferences, resulting in the individual building 
more (less) slack into future budgets.  
Recent research finds that individuals with a stronger ethical position against lying tend 
to build less slack into their budget reports (Stevens 2002; Douglas and Wier 2000). 
Additionally, higher preferences for honesty by subordinates decreases the extent to which 
superiors build slack into their budget (Church, Hannan, and Kuang 2012). Taken together, this 
stream of research suggests that the determinants of budgetary slack are specific to both the 
environment and individual preferences of those involved in the budget process. 
Future Research Questions 
Research on slack creation has focused on both environmental and personality variables 
to explain slack levels. However, several unanswered questions remain. For example, how do 
different controls within a control system influence a manager’s propensity to incorporate slack? 
Murphy (2001) shows that a majority of firms base their incentive contract targets on budgets. 
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However, there is little research on whether linking incentives to budgetary targets influences 
budgetary slack. Future research could also examine whether layers of managerial review 
influence slack. For example, most studies assume two people are involved in the budgeting 
process. Yet in practice, budgets go through several layers of approval before top management 
allocates resources. It is unclear whether the theories used to test budgetary slack creation with a 
single principal and a single agent generalizes to settings with more hierarchical levels of review. 
Researchers could also examine the consequences of budgetary slack from the firm’s 
perspective. The literature’s focus has been on the agent’s creation of slack. However, top 
management’s response to the agent’s budgetary request is the true output of the budgeting 
process. Future research could examine whether top management can correctly assess the 
subordinate’s slack and adjust their resource allocation decision accordingly. Specifically, future 
research can expand beyond the creation of slack to investigate whether superiors incorporate 
slack in their final resource allocation decisions. In other words, the literature can begin to focus 
on the acceptance of slack by the principal. This perspective creates new research questions. For 
example, environmental and personality variables are important not only for slack creation, but 
also for the principal’s ultimate approval of a slack budget. 
2.3 Literature on Dishonest Reporting in Other Settings  
 In addition to reviewing literature on budgetary slack, I also review literature on 
misreporting more broadly (i.e., not just related to budgetary slack). I begin with Baiman and 
Lewis (1989). In this study, the authors create two compensation contracts for participants. In 
one condition, participants select their own incentive contract given their assigned skill and effort 
levels. In the other condition, participants communicate their assigned skill and effort level to a 
superior, who then assigns them to a contract. The authors find that the two contracts are not 
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identical with respect to the level of misreporting of both skill and effort. Participants in the first 
condition are more likely to misreport versus participants in the second condition. Interestingly, 
the authors also find that the threshold amount over which most participants lie is quite low. 
Based on the low threshold, they conclude that their findings support the agency prediction that 
the two contracts are identical. Overall, this study suggests that lying to increase compensation 
would take place, provided the increase in compensation was above a relatively low threshold. 
Evans III et al. (2001) examine whether employers can incorporate employees’ preferences for 
honesty to reduce contracting costs and find evidence consistent with this prediction. This 
finding refutes Baiman and Lewis (1989)’s findings that misreporting thresholds are too low to 
make a difference in contracting. 
Research also examines mechanisms that could reduce misreporting within an 
organization. For example, Antle and Fellingham (1990) examine whether an organization’s 
commitment to multi-period contracts can reduce misreporting. They find that a control system 
must rely on performance history (i.e., it must have memory) to reduce misreporting. Hannan, 
Rankin, and Towry (2006) examine how the presence of an information system and the precision 
of the information it provides influence employee honesty. They find that the presence of an 
information system increases managerial honesty. Further, they find that honesty is lower with a 
precise versus coarse information system. The authors contend that this effect occurs because of 
the manager’s desire to appear honest. This paper and the corresponding discussion paper 
(Salterio and Webb 2006) both call for additional research to examine how control systems can 
become “enablers” of honest behavior. Other methods to reduce dishonesty include information 
acquisition on reported performance (Church, Hannan, and Kuang 2014), using firm-wide 
informal communication to influence perceived norms (Newman 2014), using rank-order 
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performance evaluations (Brown, Fisher, Sooy, and Sprinkle 2014), and paying employees a 
wage that exceeds expected wages (Chen and Sandino 2012). 
Related more closely to my dissertation, Bruner, McKee, and Santore (2008) examine 
how the actual detection likelihood of a control influences misreporting. They find that 
misreporting is negatively correlated with the actual probability of detection. While this study is 
informative, it makes an underlying assumption that employees know the actual probability of 
detection. In their study, the authors provide participants with a table informing them of the true 
detection probability. However, there are several situations where true detection likelihood is 
unknown to an employee. For example, internal audit would likely not disclose the number of 
transactions it audits to reduce the likelihood of employees gaming the system. Moreover, as 
described in this dissertation, there are choices a firm can make about their control system design 
that can influence employees’ subjective assessments of detection. 
Also related to my dissertation, Maas and Van Rinsum (2013) examine the direct effect 
that control design and compensation interdependence have on misreporting. They find that 
participants are more likely to overstate their performance if it increases versus decreases the 
monetary payoff to their peers. In addition, misreporting is lower under an open information 
policy, in which each individual’s reported performance is public knowledge, compared to a 
closed information policy. The authors also test for an interactive effect of these two variables on 
misreporting, but do not find one. As described in Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, I rely on 
this study to motivate my research question and develop my hypotheses.  
Future Research Questions 
 While a number of studies have examined factors that can influence misreporting, there is 
still much work to do. Many studies consider misreporting to be a single construct. However, 
11 
 
misreporting can vary in terms of both the magnitude and the content of the misreported 
information. For example, a low-level employee within a service firm that misreports his or her 
hours spent working on a client is a far different setting than a manager who misreports division 
performance. In the former case, the employee is misreporting time, which leads to overbilling of 
the client. In the latter case, the employee is directly misreporting monetary amounts. However, 
no research has examined whether differences in content of the misreported information affects 
misreporting. 
 Future research can also examine whether the difficulty of performance targets in a 
contract influence misreporting. Generally, one might think that more difficult performance 
targets result in more dishonesty. However, if targets are framed to the employee as very difficult 
to achieve (e.g., stretch targets) does this framing lead to more or less dishonest reporting? 
Specifically, does classifying the target as one that is not likely to be met without substantial 
effort increase dishonest reporting in an attempt to achieve the unlikely goal or does the 
employee not feel pressure to meet the stretch goal and, therefore, does not feel the need to 
overstate performance? How do initial target level and the revision of targets over time influence 
misreporting? There is still much to explore in this area. 
 More closely related to my dissertation, a number of studies examine how environmental 
factors influence misreporting. However, these papers have not focused on whether features 
specific to a control itself influence misreporting. For example, existing research does not 
examine how the location of a control within a firm’s hierarchy influences its perceived 
effectiveness. Controls incorporated at lower levels of the hierarchical structure have the 
advantage of being physically closer to the reporting individual. However, it is likely to be a 
supervisor who has daily interactions with the reporting employee who designs, implements, and 
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performs the control. This could result in low control effectiveness. This provides tension to the 
research question of how control centralization influences misreporting. My dissertation 
examines how the physical location of a control can influence employees’ perceptions of the 
control’s effectiveness. 
2.4 Literature on Monitoring 
 Because opportunity for error and fraud within a reporting system exists, a firm 
implements a control system to serve a monitoring role within the organization. In this section, I 
focus on the reduction of intentional misstatements through control system design. I begin with 
research in the late 1990’s. Evans III and Sridhar (1996) examined a firm’s use of both a 
financial reporting system and a contracting system in the principal agent model with moral 
hazard. The authors find that the compensation system alone is not enough to generate truthful 
reporting. Specifically, the compensation system can solve the moral hazard problem, but to 
induce truthful reporting, the principal must rely on the financial reporting system and controls. 
Caplan (1999) finds that managers with a propensity to misreport prefer a weak control system. 
However, third parties could potentially be less inclined to search for fraud given a weak control 
system because the third party will likely associate a “bad” outcome with an error instead of 
fraud. With a strong control system, a “bad” outcome is more likely to be associated with fraud.  
 A shift in the control system literature began in early 2000. Researchers began to 
investigate not only formal controls, but also social controls that peers place on employees. For 
example, Towry (2003) provides evidence that, when team identity is high, horizontal 
monitoring systems, in which employees monitor and regulate their peers’ performance, can be 
more effective than a vertical monitoring system, in which the employee’s superior is responsible 
for monitoring. Coletti, Sedatole, and Towry (2005) examine whether a formal control system 
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influences cooperation within collaborative environments. They find that control systems 
improve trust and cooperation within collaborative environments, resulting in overall higher 
levels of performance within collaborative environments. Based on their results, the authors 
argue that firms will choose to implement stronger control systems than prior research suggests. 
Interestingly, contemporaneous research suggests the opposite. Falk and Kosfeld (2006) find that 
agents reduce their performance in response to the principal’s decision to implement a control. 
Their manipulation is the presence or absence of a minimum performance level within the 
incentive contract, which is different from the control in Coletti et al. (2005). This suggests that a 
better understanding of how different controls can increase or decrease trust and their subsequent 
effect on employee performance could be fruitful. 
 Research also examines whether formal controls undermine trust (Christ et al. 2008). 
This literature examines how control framing influences employees’ perceptions of trust and 
employees’ task performance (Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2012) and how control type (i.e., 
preventative, detective) influences employees’ performance (Christ et al. 2012).  
 Recently, several new directions in control research have emerged. For example, 
Campbell, Epstein, and Martinez-Jerez (2011) examine how control “tightness” influences 
learning among employees. They find that relatively “loose” control systems lead to higher 
levels of learning than relatively “tight” control systems. Researchers have also expanded the 
definition of a control system to include employee selection into and out of the firm. Campbell 
(2012) examines the role that employee selection through different channels into the firm can 
play in their subsequent “match” with the firm. He finds that those employees who self-selected 
through a channel more likely to “match” their preferences to the firm’s preferences are more 
likely to use decision-making authority and make less risky decisions.  
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 Researchers have also examined the role that control systems have in creating norms for 
or against a behavior. Tayler and Bloomfield (2011) find that controls can create a norm of what 
behavior a firm expects of its employees. They also find that after a firm removes a control, the 
established norms are strong enough to govern behavior. This suggests that controls play a role 
in norm creation and can have an indirect influence on employees’ behaviors by signaling 
appropriate and inappropriate behaviors.  
Future Research Questions 
 There are several unanswered questions related to control system design. Prior studies 
have found divergent results when examining whether formal controls help or hurt performance. 
Future research can provide additional insight into moderating variables that help define this 
relation. Does the manner in which management implements the control influence how the 
control influences performance? Similarly, does the manner in which management 
communicates the implementation of a new control or the change of an existing control influence 
employees’ perceptions of the control? Future research can also explore the interaction of 
controls within the control system. For example, does the implementation of one type of control, 
such as a compensation control, influence the effectiveness of another type of control, such as a 
formal monitoring control?  
 A firm does not implement controls in a vacuum. Future research can examine how the 
relationships between employees and their superiors influence the effectiveness of a control 
system. Research has recently begun to investigate whether controls create norms for or against 
specific behavior (Tayler and Bloomfield 2011). Future research can further investigate the role 
that controls play in the creation of both descriptive and injunctive norms. To what extent do 
formal controls serve as a signal to employees about the type of behavior the firm expects? How 
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can control design strengthen or weaken this signal? How do the actions of peers either 
strengthen or weaken the signal that controls send to employees? How does control ownership 
delegation to lower-level employees influence employees’ perceptions of the control? 
2.5 Literature on the Effect of Physical Distance 
 Few studies examine the role that geographic distance plays in performance reporting. 
This could be due to the assumption that monitoring costs increase with geographic dispersion 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) and, given the higher monitoring costs, on the margin one would 
expect to see greater misreporting as geographic dispersion increases. However, this assumption 
needs to be tested. Consider a wheel-and-spokes model of a firm. Is it the distance between the 
reporting manager and the firm’s central headquarters (the length of the spokes) or is it the 
distance among the different reporting managers (the distance between the spokes) that influence 
reporting decisions? The answer could have different implications for firms’ organizational 
design choices. Moreover, how does the distance between reporting managers and a control itself 
influence reporting behavior? 
 Literature outside of accounting that has examined geographic dispersion has revealed 
some interesting patterns. For example, more geographically dispersed organizations tend to be 
less employee friendly and more likely to dismiss employees (Landier, Nair, and Wulf 2009). 
Firms that are more geographically dispersed also tend to have higher communication costs, 
which can result in lower communication with distant business units (Baaij and Slangen 2013). 
When deciding what business units or divisions to divest, on average, firms select those business 
units that are more geographically distant from the firm’s central headquarters (Landier et al. 
2009).  
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 There have been a few studies in the auditing literature that have examined how 
geographic proximity influences audit quality. For example, Choi, Kim, Qiu, and Zang (2012) 
find that their proxies for audit quality decrease as a client is located farther from the local audit 
firm’s headquarters. Similarly, DeFond, Francis, and Hu (2011) and Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) 
examine how geographic distances factor into SEC enforcements. They find that auditors are less 
aggressive with their auditing as the distance between the engagement office and the SEC 
regional office increases. This research, taken together, suggests that geographic distance plays a 
role in behavior. In the sections that follow, I describe how I extend this research by examining 
whether the physical distance between a control and a reporting manager influences the reporting 
manager’s reporting behavior. 
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CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Background 
3.1.1 Self-Reported Performance 
 Information asymmetry often forces a principal to rely on self-reported performance from 
multiple agents (Baiman and Evans III 1983). Although the principal prefers fully-verified 
information, she often must rely upon partially- or non-verified information because full 
monitoring is cost-prohibitive (Baiman and Rajan 1994). Monitoring controls partially verify 
information by probabilistically selecting and reviewing reports for misreported performance 
(Dye 1986). Analytic research typically sets the detection likelihood of a monitoring control as a 
parameter in the model (e.g., Narayanan and Davila 1998). However, in the natural setting, it is 
likely that the principal does not have a precise measure of the true detection likelihood. Even if 
the principal has a sense of the true detection likelihood, it is not necessarily in her best interest 
to reveal this information to the agents. Because agents are uncertain of true detection likelihood, 
their subjective assessment of detection likelihood drives reporting behavior.1 
3.1.2 Control Centralization 
 Following prior literature, I define control centralization as the extent to which a control 
is consolidated and coordinated within a firm (Anderson et al. 2010). Within the context of 
control centralization, I examine an outcome of the control centralization decision, specifically, 
employees’ decisions to misreport performance. While I focus on an outcome of control 
centralization, one should note that little research on the determinants of control centralization 
1 Detection likelihood can either be independent of performance or contingent upon performance (Baiman and 
Demski 1980). In both settings, the agent will likely not know the true detection likelihood, making the subjective 
detection likelihood important in both. I focus on the setting where the review is independent of performance. 
However, the theory I test would likely generalize to settings where detection likelihood is contingent upon 
performance. 
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exists. That which does exist comes from two public accounting firms. Ernst & Young (2012) 
highlights five determinants of control centralization: 1) the broader structure of the business, 2) 
the organization’s risk profile, 3) cost, 4) independence requirements, and 5) geographic 
diversity. PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2012) adds the desire of maintaining a physical presence in 
multiple locations as another determinant. 
 I focus on the effect that control centralization has on misreporting because firms 
implement formal monitoring controls in part to reduce dishonest reporting. As such, a natural 
question to ask is how control design (i.e., centralization) influences reporting behavior. By 
examining whether control centralization reduces misreporting, this dissertation highlights an 
exogenous choice that management can make to reduce performance misreporting.  
3.1.2.1 Control Centralization Framework 
As mentioned, I define control centralization as the extent to which a control is 
consolidated and coordinated within a firm (Anderson et al. 2010). This definition implies that 
control centralization is a multi-faceted construct. In this section, I describe the five most 
important components of control centralization. I consider these five components to be the most 
important because prior literature shows that they differ both across and within firms, and, 
importantly, this variance will likely have a significant impact on the perception of a control as 
being relatively more centralized or more decentralized. The five components of control 
centralization are 1) the location where the control work occurs, 2) the location of the control 
within the firm’s hierarchy, 3) the social distance between the reporting manager and control 
facilitator, 4) the consistency of the control within the firm, and 5) the use of a single or multiple 
administrative systems.  
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Figure 1 provides the control centralization framework. One can classify a control as 
relatively more centralized or more decentralized, depending on how the five components of 
control centralization are structured. In the middle of Figure 1, the vertical line with the 
“centralized” and “decentralized” endpoints represents the centralized/decentralized continuum 
along which one can classify a control. The placement of the control along that continuum is 
contingent upon the state of each of the five control centralization components. One can classify 
each component (the boxes in Figure 1) as relatively more centralized or more decentralized 
using the state of each component. As one classifies more components of a control as centralized 
(decentralized), the control classification moves further up (down) along the control 
centralization continuum. For example, ceteris paribus, one would place a control that has its 
manual work done relatively far from reporting managers higher up on the continuum than a 
control that has its manual work done relatively close to reporting managers. As such, 
understanding the control centralization components is critical to classifying a control as more 
centralized or more decentralized. In the following subsections, I describe each component of 
control centralization in detail.  
3.1.2.2 Location where the Control Work Occurs 
 Many controls have a manual component to them, and where that manual work occurs is 
the first component of control centralization. Firms can design controls such that the manual 
control work occurs geographically far from or close to the reporting manager (centralized and 
decentralized states, respectively). For example, in a case study examining expatriates at Nokia 
Telecommunications, Tahvanainen (2000) describes how some middle manager expatriates had 
goal setting, performance evaluation, and training and development performed by senior 
managers located in the host country while some middle manager expatriates had senior 
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managers located at the primary headquarters of the firm perform those functions. Ernst & 
Young (2012) describes the work of the internal audit function as either taking place at each 
business unit or at a firm’s central headquarters. Moreover, remote internal audits, in which 
internal audit team members on site work jointly and directly report to a remote lead audit team 
(on location at the firm headquarters) (Teeter, Alles, and Vasarhelyi 2010), are another example 
of the physical work of a control being performed relatively close to or far from the reporting 
manager.2   
3.1.2.3 Location of the Control within the Firm’s Hierarchy 
 Within a firm’s hierarchy, management can implement a control at relatively higher or 
lower levels (centralized and decentralized states, respectively). For example, Indjejikian and 
Matějka (2012) show that the budgeting process is either implemented at the business unit level 
(decentralized) or at the corporate level (centralized) within a firm’s hierarchy. Fjeldstad et al. 
(2012) describe how historically, large organizations, such as the railroad and steel companies of 
the late 1800s, had highly centralized controls. Contrast that to the currently decentralized 
control structure of the State of Illinois, where the creation and review of financial reporting 
forms takes place at each of the state’s 821 primary government/fiduciary funds and 26 
component units (Holland 2011). These examples suggest variation exists in where management 
implements controls within a firm’s hierarchy. 
3.1.2.4 Social Distance between the Reporting Manager and Control Facilitator 
 The third component of control centralization is the social distance between the 
individual subject to the control and the individual performing the control. The more (less) social 
2 As described in this article, remote audits can involve a virtual team, which “coordinates auditing activities among 
auditors who are physically present at the audit site and auditors who are located in other locations, such as [the 
client’s] corporate headquarters.” 
21 
 
                                                          
distance between the two parties, the more centralized (decentralized) the state of the social 
distance component of control centralization is. By social distance, I mean the perceived 
“closeness” of the two parties. Consider a budget variance investigation performed by a business 
unit controller versus one performed by the corporate controller. The reporting manager is likely 
to be socially closer to the business unit controller than the corporate controller because they 
generally interact more frequently. Maas and Matějka (2009) explore this relationship by 
examining how a business unit controller must balance their role of local responsibility (i.e., a 
business partner) and functional responsibility (i.e., a corporate police officer). Compared to 
corporate controllers, the balancing act is more difficult for the business unit controllers because 
of the “closeness” the business unit controller has with people within the business unit relative to 
the greater social distance that the executive controller likely feels. 
3.1.2.5 Control Consistency within the Firm 
 The fourth component of control centralization is the extent to which a control is 
consistent within the firm. The more (less) consistent a control is across the divisions of a firm, 
the more centralized (decentralized) the state of the consistency component of control 
centralization is. Grabner and Moers (2013) describe a performance evaluation system for 
salespeople that was highly formalized and closely monitored by the human resource department 
to “ensure compliance and consistency” across different banks. However, other studies suggest a 
fair amount of variation across controls within a firm. For example,  Maas and Matějka (2009) 
point out that business unit managers and controllers within their sample have a great amount of 
influence over the performance evaluation process within their business unit. This suggests that 
performance evaluation across this firm’s business units is not as standardized as the evaluations 
in Grabner and Moers' (2013) setting. 
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3.1.2.6 Single or Multiple Administrative Systems 
 The fifth component of control centralization is the use of a single or multiple 
administrative systems. The fewer (more) systems used to administer the control, the more 
centralized (decentralized) the state of the administrative system component of control 
centralization is. The use of a single administrative system is often associated with an enterprise 
planning resource (ERP) system, such as SAP. For example, Jørgensen and Messner (2009) point 
out in their case study that the decision to implement SAP is made to make the firm operate as if 
it were a single unit. A byproduct of this decision is that management can implement a control 
within the firm’s single ERP system, making the control component more centralized. However, 
firms that do not use a single ERP system, such as those that grow through mergers and 
acquisitions, use several legacy systems and rely on the controls embedded within the different 
legacy systems (Abdinnour-Helm, Lengnick-Hall, and Lengnick-Hall 2003). The administrative 
system component of these controls is more decentralized in nature. 
3.1.2.7 Additional Examples of Control Centralization 
Examples of controls that can be centralized or decentralized include a firm’s internal 
audit function, budgetary variance investigations, and formal performance reviews. A survey 
issued by Ernst & Young (2012) finds that 49 percent of surveyed firms have an internal audit 
function centralized in one location while the remaining 51 percent of surveyed firms have either 
a regional hub-and-spoke internal audit model (16 percent) or a decentralized internal audit 
function present at each major business unit (35 percent). Further, in a survey of 236 
organizations, Anderson et al. (2010) find that approximately 25 percent of firms have a 
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decentralized internal control structure, 28 percent have a centralized control structure, and 47 
percent have a partially decentralized structure.3 
Maas and Matějka (2009) find that some business unit controllers have high levels of 
control over the business unit budgeting process while other business unit controllers have little 
to no control over the budgeting process. In the latter case, management implements the 
budgeting process at a level above the business unit level within the organization, making it more 
centralized. Similarly, the 10-K disclosure of D.R. Horton, provided as Appendix 1, reveals that 
each division is responsible for the review of division business plans, budgets, acquisition 
contracts, and inventory levels. Each of these reviews represents a control that the firm has 
chosen to decentralize. 
3.1.2.8 Control Centralization Operationalization 
 I focus on the first component of control centralization. That is, I focus on the physical 
location of control work component of control centralization. I do so for two reasons. First, the 
location where control work occurs represents an exogenous choice variable that the firm can 
make with respect to how it designs its control system. Other components of control 
centralization, such as the social distance between a superior and a reporting employee, develop 
endogenously and are likely to be highly idiosyncratic. As such, the location of control work 
component occurs represents a dial that a firm can adjust relatively easily to create different 
employee perceptions about a control. 
 The second reason I focus on the location of control work component is that the 
practitioner literature appears to suggest that location is a first order effect. Specifically, both 
3 Partial decentralized structures, also called hub-and-spoke structures, consist of a primary central hub where the 
control takes place (usually within a firm’s headquarters) and smaller “spokes” where the control also occurs on a 
smaller scale. For example, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2012) provides an example of a global firm that has their 
internal audit “hub” in the United States and several “spokes” in their Asia, Australia, and Europe business units. 
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Ernst & Young (2012) and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2012) describe geographic diversity as a 
primary determinant in the decision to centralize controls.4 These reports also describe how a 
control can change based on the physical location where the work takes place. Therefore, these 
reports appear to suggest that location is a first order effect in control centralization decisions. 
Given our limited understanding of the consequences associated with a more centralized versus 
decentralized control, I focus on what prior research suggests is the most critical control 
centralization component to make the strongest contribution possible. 
3.1.3 Compensation Interdependence 
I define compensation interdependence as the extent to which compensation is contingent 
upon group-based or individual-based performance (Nalbantian and Schotter 1997). For 
example, bonuses based on a division’s overall performance have greater interdependence than a 
bonus based on individual performance. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Maas and Van 
Rinsum 2013; Sandino 2007; Malmi and Brown 2008), I consider compensation system design 
to be a feature of a firm’s control system.  
Management can implement interdependent compensation to increase knowledge sharing 
and coordination within a firm. For example, Hwang, Erkens, and Evans III (2009) show that 
manufacturing plants rely more on group-based performance measures when the value of sharing 
knowledge is high and more on individual-based performance measures when the value of 
sharing information is low. Similarly, FitzRoy and Kraft (1987) find that employee coordination 
and cooperation increases as a firm uses compensation that is relatively more group-based.  
Increasing compensation interdependence can also lead to problems. A common problem 
associated with group-based pay is the decision of some employees to free ride on the effort of 
4 These studies describe the decision to centralize or decentralize controls. Using my framework, centralizing or 
decentralizing control components is a more precise way to state this. 
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other employees (Holmstrom 1982). Recent literature has also shown that interdependent 
compensation can lead to aggressive decision making (Sutter 2009). This aggressive decision 
making has been shown to increase the level of dishonest reporting among employees (Maas and 
Van Rinsum 2013; Church, Hannan, and Kuang 2012).  
Despite numerous studies that have examined the direct effect of compensation 
interdependence on positive or negative outcomes, there remains little research on the 
moderating effect that compensation interdependence can have on the relation of other controls 
with these outcomes. In other words, prior literature has not established what effect 
compensation interdependence can have on other firm-level control choice variables. For 
example, does compensation interdependence increase or decrease the effectiveness of other 
controls within the control system? In this study, I investigate the moderating effect that 
compensation interdependence can have on the relation between control centralization and 
misreporting. 
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
 Prior research shows that the physical distance between an individual and an object can 
influence the individual’s perception of that object (Fujita et al. 2006). This suggests that the 
physical distance between a reporting employee and a control could influence both the 
employee’s perception of control effectiveness and, subsequently, his or her reporting behavior. 
In the following subsections, I argue that increasing the physical distance between a reporting 
employee and a formal control, (i.e., control centralization) decreases an employee’s subjective 
assessment of detection, which, ceteris paribus, increases dishonest reporting. Next, I argue that 
compensation interdependence moderates the relation between an employee’s subjective 
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assessment of detection and dishonest reporting. Figure 2 provides a framework for my theory 
and predictions. 
3.2.1 Control Centralization and Subjective Assessment of Detection 
 I first consider how the physical distance between a reporting employee and a formal 
control can influence the employee’s subjective assessment of the likelihood of the control 
detecting misreporting. I predict that increasing the physical distance between a reporting 
employee and a formal control decreases the employee’s subjective assessment of the likelihood 
of the control detecting misreporting. I base this prediction on psychological distance theory.  
Psychological distance is a subjective feeling that an object or event is close to or distant 
from oneself in the current moment (Magee and Smith 2013; Trope and Liberman 2010). Four 
related dimensions of distance (spatial, temporal, social, and hypotheticality) determine this 
feeling of closeness. As an individual perceives an object or event to occur (1) physically closer 
rather than farther, (2) sooner rather than later, (3) to a socially similar as opposed to dissimilar 
individual, and (4) with higher probability rather than lower probability, psychological distance 
between the individual and the object or event decreases (Trope et al. 2007).  
Prior research suggests that the four dimensions of psychological distance are interrelated 
such that an increase in one dimension will cause a perceived increased in the other three 
dimensions. For example, Fiedler et al. (2012) manipulated two dimensions of psychological 
distance, (spatial and social) and then measured participants’ assessments of the two non-
manipulated dimensions (temporal and hypothetical). Their findings suggest that the measured 
dimensions are positively associated with the manipulated dimensions such that an increase in 
two of the dimensions resulted in an increase in participants’ perception of the other two 
dimensions. Similarly, Zhang and Wang (2009) show that participants’ subjective assessment of 
27 
 
winning a trip to visit a city changes as the location of the city changes. Specifically, participants 
perceive a lower probability of winning the trip as the destination city increases in distance from 
the participant’s current location. Yan (2014) finds similar results. He finds that participants 
seated closer to a laptop, which is the prize for a drawing, perceive their chances of winning the 
laptop to be higher than those participants seated further away from the laptop. 
The Zhang and Wang (2009) and Yan (2014) studies both suggest that the perceived 
hypotheticality of an event is associated with the spatial distance between an individual and the 
salient outcome of the event (i.e., winning a prize). This salient event has both a low probability 
of occurrence and a high outcome effect on the individual relative to the counterfactual outcome 
(i.e., not winning a prize). Similarly, I contend that the salient outcome of a control designed to 
detect misreporting is the detection of misreporting. That is, the detection of misreporting is not 
likely to occur often within the organization. When a control does detect misreporting, there are 
also likely high consequences. Therefore, I predict that greater physical distance between where 
the control work occurs and the reporting employee (i.e., control centralization) increases the 
perceived hypotheticality of a control detecting performance misreporting. In other words, 
greater control centralization will decrease an individual’s subjective assessment of a control’s 
likelihood of detecting misreporting. 
H1: Greater control centralization decreases employees’ subjective assessments 
of detection likelihood. 
 
The “H1” link in Figure 2 represents this prediction. It is important to note that this 
prediction is independent of compensation interdependence. In the next subsection, I describe 
how compensation interdependence moderates the relation between employees’ subjective 
assessments of detection and misreporting behavior. 
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3.2.2 Compensation Interdependence and Misreporting 
 Prior literature suggests that group membership can lead to aggressive, risky decision 
making (Charness et al. 2007; Luhan et al. 2009; Yechiam et al. 2008).5 Related literature also 
finds that individuals lie more when they share the benefit of the lie with another person than 
when there is no mutual benefit  (Erat and Gneezy 2012; Gneezy 2005). Taken together, this 
literature suggests that high compensation interdependence will have an adverse effect on 
reporting behavior. 
 Two recent accounting studies have leveraged these findings to predict a positive main 
effect for compensation interdependence on misreporting. Church et al. (2012) show that 
managers create more budgetary slack when they share the benefits of slack with a subordinate 
than when they alone receive the benefits. Maas and Van Rinsum (2013) show that more 
dishonest reporting occurs when misreported performance positively influences peers’ 
compensation than when it negatively influences peers’ compensation. Consistent with this 
reasoning, I predict that compensation interdependence will have a positive main effect on 
dishonest reporting. The direct link from compensation interdependence to misreporting in 
Figure 2 represents this prediction. 
 I also predict that compensation interdependence will moderate the relation between an 
individual’s subjective assessment of detection and reporting behavior. As discussed at the 
beginning of this subsection, high compensation interdependence leads to aggressive, risky 
decision making. Consider how this behavior will influence the effectiveness of a control in 
reducing misreporting. Assume two employees considering misreporting. Employee A is more 
aggressive in his reporting behavior than Employee B because of higher compensation 
5 Sutter (2009) finds that the mere notion of payoff commonality, as opposed to formal team membership, is 
sufficient to induce aggressive decisions. 
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interdependence. Consider the input into both employees’ reporting decisions from Hypothesis 1: 
their subjective assessment that a control will detect misreporting. If management makes a 
control design decision, such as decentralizing a control, that increases by the same amount both 
employees’ subjective assessments of detection (i.e., Hypothesis 1), how will this affect 
reporting behavior? Given Employee A’s higher level of aggressive reporting from 
compensation interdependence, the control design decision is less likely to influence his  
reporting behavior than Employee B’s reporting behavior. To elaborate, the presence of 
compensation interdependence increases aggressive reporting behavior, which reduces an 
individual’s sensitivity to changes in the subjective assessments of detection.  
 This logic suggests that compensation interdependence will moderate the relation 
between an individual’s subjective assessment of detection and misreporting behavior, as 
illustrated by the “H2” link in Figure 2 (i.e., moderated mediation). Specifically, individuals’ 
subjective assessments of detection are less likely to drive reporting behavior with high 
compensation interdependence, suggesting a muting of the effect that control centralization has 
on reporting behavior. With low compensation interdependence, individuals’ subjective 
assessments of control effectiveness are more pertinent to their reporting decision, suggesting 
that control centralization will have a stronger effect on reporting behavior. Put another way, 
employees’ subjective assessments of detection, developed endogenously from control 
centralization, potentially translate into a different honest versus dishonest reporting decision by 
employees compensated interdependently versus compensated independently.6 
6 Of course, extreme detection likelihood assessments likely lead to the same reporting decision, regardless of 
compensation interdependence. That is, when assessed likelihood is sufficiently high (low), the moderating effect of 
compensation interdependence is likely insufficient to preclude employees from reporting honestly (dishonestly). 
My theory is more applicable to scenarios in which employees’ reporting decisions are more ambiguous. 
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Ultimately, this discussion suggests that employees are more likely to misreport at a 
given level of perceived detection likelihood when their compensation is interdependent than 
when it is independent of others’ performance reporting. 
H2: The difference in the extent of performance misreporting between a 
centralized and decentralized control is greater when compensation 
interdependence is low than when compensation interdependence is high. 
 
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of Hypothesis 2. Taken together, my 
hypotheses suggest a model consistent with moderated-mediation. Specifically, subjective 
detection likelihood is the mechanism by which control centralization influences employees’ 
propensity to misreport performance, and compensation interdependence moderates the effect of 
this mediator on employee performance reporting. As discussed in Chapter 6, I also investigate 
the extent to which compensation interdependence moderates the effect of control centralization 
on perceived detection likelihood (i.e., the hypothesized mediator underlying Hypothesis 1). 
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD 
 
4.1 Overview  
The experiment involves a setting in which participants make a series of independent 
reporting decisions. In each round, participants have the option to over-report performance to 
increase their compensation. However, they are subject to a control that probabilistically detects 
misreported performance. I use a 2 x 2 (between-subjects) x 6 (within-subjects) experiment 
design. The between-subjects manipulations (described in detail later) are (1) the spatial distance 
between a participant and the control (Near Review / Far Review) and (2) the extent of 
compensation interdependence (High CI / Low CI). The within-subjects manipulation reflects 
that participants make independent reporting decisions in six rounds. 
4.2 Procedures 
 Upon entering the lab, participants read instructions, answered quiz questions about the 
instructions, and read a compensation example on their computer. The facilitator then 
demonstrated the review process, and participants completed a practice round. Participants then 
performed the reporting task for six rounds, answered post-experiment questions, collected their 
payment, and left the lab. Each session took between 50 and 60 minutes. Figure 4 provides a 
timeline of the experiment.  
 The instructions informed participants to assume that they were in charge of reporting a 
project’s performance to their supervisor. Each round, the computer program randomly 
generated and privately informed each participant of the actual revenue (uniformly distributed 
between $2.00 and $6.00, inclusive) that his or her project generated. After having received their 
actual revenue, participants reported their project’s revenue. They could report any amount of 
revenue between the actual revenue generated and $6.00 (i.e., participants could over-report, but 
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not under-report). At the end of each round, after all participants reported their project’s revenue, 
a review process took place. 
 For the review process, the facilitator randomly selected a poker chip for each participant 
from a bowl containing 92 white poker chips and 8 red poker chips. Participants did not know 
the total number of poker chips in the bowl nor the ratio of red to white chips. If the facilitator 
selected a white poker chip, then the review process ended for that participant. However, if the 
facilitator selected a red poker chip, he compared that participant’s reported revenue to their 
actual revenue. If the two amounts differed, the computer program adjusted their compensation 
to zero for the round.7 If the participant had a red chip drawn and had honestly reported or had a 
white chip drawn, then no adjustment to their compensation occurred. Across all conditions and 
all rounds, the facilitator held up each individual’s poker chip and announced its color to all 
participants in the session before placing it back into the bowl.  
I set the probability of a participant being selected for a review in a given round 
intentionally low (8 percent) to increase the likelihood of observing my construct of interest, 
performance misreporting. I also hold the rate constant across conditions, which allows me to 
make meaningful comparisons across conditions. 
 Recall that a review demonstration took place after the instructions and before the 
practice round. During the demonstration, the facilitator explained how the poker chip selection 
would work, held up a transparent bowl with the 100 poker chips, and walked once up and down 
the center aisle of the computer lab while churning the poker chips in the bowl. Because the 
7 Participants input the color of the poker chip selected for their review into the computer program, and the program 
updated their compensation accordingly. The experimenter also kept a written record of the color of poker chip 
selected for each participant to validate participants truthfully input the outcome of the review process. Only 1 out of 
516 color-reports was incorrectly reported. Results are inferentially identical when dropping this observation. 
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facilitator did not announce the true number of red and white poker chips, this process enabled 
participants to make a subjective assessment of the relative number of red and white chips. After 
the facilitator walked up and down the aisle once, he put the bowl containing the poker chips 
inside a non-transparent bag for the duration of the review process. This ensured that participants 
could not count the ratio of red and white chips during the rest of the session, and that neither the 
participants nor the facilitator knew the color of the chip as the facilitator selected it. 
4.3 Variables and Compensation Detail 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
I focus on two dependent variables based on the difference between reported and actual 
revenue. The first dependent variable (Overstate) is the difference between reported revenue and 
actual revenue. I calculate the second dependent variable (Dishonesty) as follows: (Reported 
Revenue – Actual Revenue)/(Max Revenue – Actual Revenue) where max revenue is $6.00 in all 
conditions. This variable captures the extent to which participants misreported, given the amount 
they could misreport. This variable is also consistent with prior literature (Maas and Van Rinsum 
2013).  
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
The first between-subjects manipulated variable is the location of the review process. In 
the Near Review condition, the poker chip selection and revenue comparison for each participant 
took place at each participant’s desk. In the Far Review condition, the selection and comparison 
for each participant took place at the front of the room. Specifically, in the Near Review 
condition the facilitator would go to each participant’s desk and draw a poker chip. If the chip 
was red, the participant’s computer would display the reported and actual revenue and the 
facilitator would write down the information. In the Far Review condition, the facilitator would 
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stand at the front of the room to draw each participant’s poker chip. If the chip was red, the 
computer program provided the participant’s reported and actual revenue to the facilitator’s 
computer (at the front of the room) where he would write down the information. Across all 
conditions, because the facilitator announced the color of the poker chip, participants knew 
whether each individual participant had a red or white chip drawn. However, if the facilitator 
selected a red chip, the review outcome was private in that no other participants discovered if 
performance had been misreported. 
I made this design choice to keep the perceived non-economic costs of misreporting, such 
as shame and embarrassment, consistent across conditions. Specifically, if the outcome of the 
review process were public, one could argue that reducing the distance between the review 
process and a participant not only changes the perceived detection likelihood, but also increases 
the perceived non-economic costs of having misreported performance detected because the 
facilitator is standing relatively close and all other participants are watching. By not revealing 
whether the review process detected misreporting or not, the non-economic costs of misreporting 
should be constant across conditions. I validate this assumption in Chapter 7. 
The second between-subjects manipulation relates to how participants earned 
compensation. Across all conditions, the computer program assigned a random, anonymous 
partner for the duration of the session to each participant. Each round, after the reporting 
decision but before the review, the computer program would inform participants of their 
partner’s reported revenue (but not their actual revenue). In the High CI condition, compensation 
is the average of (1) the participant’s reported revenue and (2) his or her partner’s reported 
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revenue. Specifically, the program calculated per round compensation in the High CI condition 
using the following formula:8 
Compensation = 12 (Reported Revenue − $2.00) + 12 (Partner′s Reported Revenue − $2.00) 
In the Low CI condition, participants were still able to view their partner’s reported 
revenue each round, holding constant the presence of another participant’s reporting decision 
across all conditions. However, in the Low CI condition, per round compensation was not 
contingent upon the partner’s reporting decision. Specifically, the program calculated 
compensation per round using the following formula: Compensation = Reported Revenue − $2.00 
 
4.3.3 Additional Compensation Detail 
Across all conditions, compensation was the sum of three out of six randomly selected 
rounds. In addition to this amount, participants earn bonus compensation. Each session had a 
fixed bonus pool of $40.00 and each participant received a portion of the bonus pool based on his 
or her reported revenue. The allocation calculation is as follows: 
∑ Reported Revenue3i=1
∑ All Participants in the session′s Reported Revenue3i=1 ∗ $40.00 
 
Where i refers to the randomly selected rounds.9 
The experiment design includes a bonus pool so participants were not only hurting the 
experimenter by dishonestly reporting, but also hurting other participants by taking a larger 
portion of the fixed bonus. By invoking a harm to others by misreporting performance this 
reduced the likelihood that participants would consider misreporting to be “costless.” It is 
8 The $2.00 represents the per-round fixed cost of the project and is consistent across all conditions. 
9 On average, there were just under eleven participants per session. Average bonus pool compensation per 
participant was $3.72, or 26 percent of their total compensation. 
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important to note that the bonus was consistent across all conditions and, although it introduced 
negative compensation interdependence, I did not manipulate the presence of negative 
compensation interdependence across conditions.10 
Across all conditions, the review also affected participants’ bonus pool calculation. If a 
participant had a red poker chip selected and had misreported for any of the three randomly 
selected rounds used to calculate the bonus allocation in that round, the reported revenue for that 
round would be zero for the basis of calculating the bonus.11  
  
10 Prior research examines negative compensation interdependence (e.g., Maas and Van Rinsum 2013) where high 
reported performance from one employee decreases the payouts to other employees. My study manipulates positive 
compensation interdependence because research suggests firms are using compensation with positive 
interdependence more frequently (Lazear and Shaw 2007) and the theory predicting my interaction is more likely to 
play out in settings with positive compensation interdependence as opposed to negative compensation 
interdependence. I discuss how this limits the generalizability of my study in Chapter 9. 
11 Across all conditions, the detection of a participant’s misreporting did not affect the payout of the participant’s 
partner. I made this design choice to ensure the anonymity of partners. Specifically, because there were only a few 
red poker chips relative to white poker chips, a significant percentage of rounds (42 percent) had only one red chip 
drawn. Since only one person in those rounds was reviewed, a participant who saw a decrease in his or her 
compensation resulting from their partner’s reporting decision in those rounds would know who their partner was. 
Prior research suggests that anonymity can influence misreporting decisions (e.g., Mayhew and Murphy 2008). 
Therefore, to provide a meaningful comparison of dishonest reporting by keeping anonymity consistent across 
conditions, I designed the experiment so misreporting detection did not change the payoffs of a participant’s partner. 
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CHAPTER 5: PILOT STUDY 
 
5.1 Overview of Participants 
Fifty-four students from a large public university in the Midwest participated in the 
experiment. All students were sophomores, juniors, or seniors in the undergraduate Accountancy 
program. The average age of all participants was 20.8 years old and 37 percent of the participants 
were male. I examined if any demographic variables differed across conditions (e.g., age, 
gender). I found that age is significantly different across conditions. Therefore, all subsequent 
analyses in this chapter control for age.12 
5.2 Manipulation Checks 
 To measure whether participants attended to the experiment manipulations, participants 
answered two manipulation check questions. The first question asked during the session, where 
did the reviews take place? Participants were able to select between the two choices: at each 
participant's desk or at the front of the room. Forty-nine of the 54 participants (91 percent) 
correctly answered the question. The second question asked whether the compensation I received 
each round was influenced by the reporting decision of another participant. Participants were 
able to select either True or False. Thirty-nine of 54 participants (72 percent) correctly answered 
the question.13 
12 The difference in age is likely due to the experimental setup and recruiting procedures. Because the Near Review / 
Far Review manipulation required the experimenter to walk around the room or stand at the front of the room when 
doing the review, each experimental session was a condition (i.e., I could not manipulate centralization within each 
session). When recruiting participants, a disproportionate amount of seniors signed up for a single session (which 
worked with their class schedule). I do not make any age-specific inferences from this study. 
13 The low correct response rate could be due to the wording of the question. As such, I changed the manipulation 
check question for my final experiment. Specifically, I made it clearer that the question was specific to the 
compensation earned each round and not to the bonus payout. To investigate further whether participants attended to 
the manipulation, I examined a quiz question following the instructions. Participants within the Low CI (High CI) 
condition were asked: The higher your Reported Revenue (and your partner’s Reported Revenue), the more money 
you make each round. Participants could select either True or False. 54 out of 54 participants (100 percent) correctly 
answered this question on the first attempt, giving me comfort that participants attended to the manipulation. 
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypotheses 
 Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for variables used to calculate my dependent 
variable. Actual Revenue refers to the amount the project generated each round and is a random 
draw from a uniform distribution between 2.00 and 6.00.14 Reported Revenue is the amount 
participants reported that their project generated each round and could be any value between 
their Actual Revenue and 6.00. Overstate is the difference between Reported Revenue and 
Actual Revenue. The dependent variable of interest, Dishonesty, measures the extent to which 
participants misreported their revenue, taking into consideration the actual revenue they 
received. I calculate it as Overstate / (6.00 – Actual Revenue). Prior literature has also used this 
measure (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Maas and Van Rinsum 2013). 
Table 1 provides preliminary evidence that Dishonesty is lowest in the Low CI / Near 
Review condition (0.69). The High CI / Near Review condition also had the lowest Actual 
Revenue and Reported Revenue. A t-test reveals that Actual Revenue is marginally higher in the 
Low CI / Near Review condition (4.17) than in the High CI / Near Review (3.87) condition (p < 
0.15, two-tailed). Therefore, in subsequent analyses, I provide results in which I control for 
Actual Revenue.15 
To test my first hypothesis, I compare participants’ responses to the following post-
experiment question across conditions: Within each individual round, what did you assess the 
likelihood of being selected for a review to be? Participants responded with values between 0 
percent and 100 percent. Consistent with my theory, I find that participants in the Far Review 
condition assess the likelihood of being selected for a review to be marginally lower than those 
14 The lower bound of 2.00 represents the cost of the project. 
15 I run both models because introducing Actual Revenue as a control variable on the right hand side of the equation 
could cause a mechanical relationship with the left hand side because Actual Revenue is used to calculate 
Dishonesty.  
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participants in the Near Review condition (7.6 percent compared to 12.2 percent, one-tailed t-test 
value of p = 0.08 non-tabulated).  
My dataset consists of a panel of 324 (54 individuals x 6 rounds) pooled observations. 
Because correlation exists across rounds for the reporting decisions of any single participant, I 
use a panel estimation approach. Specifically I estimate all models with panel-specific 
heteroskedastic error terms (see e.g., Bruner, McKee, and Santore 2008). To test my second 
hypothesis, I use the following model:  Dishonesty = α0 + α1Far Review + α2(Far Review ∗ High CI) + α3High CI + α4Age + ϵ 
where Dishonesty is calculated as described above, Far Review is an indicator variable coded 
one if a participant was in the Far Review condition, zero otherwise, and High CI is an indicator 
variable coded one if a participant was in the High CI condition, zero otherwise. A negative and 
significant coefficient for 𝛼𝛼2 would be evidence supporting Hypothesis 2. 
Table 2, Model 1 provides the coefficient and standard errors from this model. Consistent 
with prior literature, I find support for the documented main effect that compensation 
interdependence has on dishonest reporting. Specifically, the coefficient for High CI is positive 
and significant (p = 0.05, one-tailed). I also find support for my second hypothesis. Specifically, 
I find a marginal negative interaction for Far Review * High CI (p = 0.08, one-tailed). This 
suggests that increased compensation interdependence decreases the effect that control 
centralization has on dishonest reporting. Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of these 
results. 
As previously mentioned, I also control for the randomly generated actual revenue for 
each participant in each round. Model 2 in Table 2 provides the output when controlling for 
Actual Revenue. The inferences remain identical when controlling for Actual Revenue. I also 
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include round-specific indicator variables. These results (non-tabulated) provide evidence that 
round-specific effects are not significant within the data. Specifically, none of the round-specific 
indicator variables is significant when all are included within the model (all p > 0.23, two-tailed), 
and their inclusion does not change any inferences.  
5.4 Evidence of Theory 
 I examine if the subjective detection likelihood variable used to test my first hypothesis 
mediates the relation between control centralization and dishonest reporting. Because 
compensation interdependence moderates this relation, I run the mediation analysis on both 
subsets of my sample (High CI and Low CI) separately (see, e.g., MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 
2007). I then compare the level of mediation that occurs within each subsample. I also control for 
age in all regressions performed in my regression analysis. 
 Figure 6 provides the results from this moderated mediation analysis. Panel A shows the 
results for those participants in the High CI condition. The second step in Baron and Kenny 
(1986) is to show that the independent variable affects the dependent variable (without the 
mediator). Within the High CI subsample, this test is not satisfied (p = 0.74, two-tailed). 
Therefore, within the High CI subsample, subjective detection likelihood does not mediate the 
relation between Control Centralization and Dishonesty. Panel B provides the results for those 
participants in the Low CI condition. In this analysis, the third step in Baron and Kenny (1986) is 
not met. Specifically, the relation between Detection Likelihood and Dishonesty is not 
significant (p = 0.80, two-tailed). Thus, perceived detection likelihood does not appear to 
mediate the relation between Control Centralization and Dishonesty in either subsample. 
 Unable to explicate the process underlying my results, I turn to exploratory analyses. I 
examine if increasing physical distance of the control decreases the perceived detection 
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likelihood, which, in turn, increases the perception that other participants dishonestly report. 
Perhaps the perception that other participants were dishonestly reporting induced increased 
dishonesty. 
 I asked participants the following post-experiment question: How effective do you think 
the review was in preventing participants from overstating revenue? Participants responded 
using a 7-point Likert Scale with higher values indicating higher perceived levels of 
effectiveness. I use this question as a measure of the extent to which participants believed the 
control prevented other participants from dishonestly reporting their performance. I label this 
variable Prevent Others. I examine if including Prevent Others as an additional step in the 
mediation path provides evidence of the underlying process driving my results. 
 Figure 7 provides the results from this additional mediation analysis. Recall that within 
the High CI subsample the second test of the Baron and Kenny (1986) was not satisfied in the 
original mediation, meaning there was no relation between the dependent and independent 
variables. Panel A reveals this holds true, as expected, in the new mediation analysis. However, 
Panel B reveals that all conditions for mediation are met in the Low CI subsample. Specifically, 
within the Low CI subsample, I find that, as controls become more physically distant, 
participants have lower subjective detection likelihood rates (p < 0.01, two-tailed). Controls 
perceived to have a lower detection likelihood are less likely to deter other participants from 
dishonestly reporting (p < 0.01, two-tailed). Controls less likely to deter other participants from 
dishonestly reporting are marginally associated with higher levels of dishonesty (p = 0.16, two-
tailed). Finally, when including the two mediating variables the coefficient of the relation 
between Control Centralization and Average Dishonesty decreases from 0.14 to 0.11.  
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The results from my pilot study generally support my hypotheses. However, the results 
were contingent upon controlling for age. Moreover, a low percentage of participants correctly 
responded to one of my manipulation checks, and all statistical tests relied upon on a small 
sample that had only one session in each experiment condition. Therefore, I run a second study 
to address these issues. I discuss the results of my second experiment in the next section. 
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CHAPTER 6: FULL EXPERIMENT 
 
 I conduct my second experiment in a manner generally consistent with my first 
experiment. I conduct the experiment in a computer laboratory using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
Eighty-six accountancy students from a large public university in the Midwest participated in the 
experiment. All but one participant were sophomores, juniors, or seniors.16 The average age of 
the participants is 20.4 years and 48 percent are male.17  
6.1 Manipulation Checks 
 To measure whether participants attended to the control centralization and compensation 
interdependence manipulations, they answered two post-experiment manipulation check 
questions. The first question asked: During your session, where did the individual performing the 
review stand while performing the review? Participants selected between two responses: at each 
participant's desk or at the front of the room. Seventy-eight of the 86 participants (91 percent) 
responded correctly. The second question asked: What calculation was used to determine how 
much you got paid each round? Participants selected either My reported revenue - $2.00 or ½ 
(My reported revenue - $2.00) + ½ (My partner’s reported revenue - $2.00). Eighty-four of 86 
participants (98 percent) responded correctly. This suggests that participants attended to the 
manipulated information across conditions.18  
16 One participant was a graduate student. Results are inferentially identical when excluding the observation. 
17 Tests for demographic differences across conditions reveal that age and English as a primary language differ 
across the control centralization conditions. This is likely a result of the centralization manipulation being across 
sessions and random assignment of sessions to control centralization conditions (described later in detail). When 
including age and language as covariates in the ANOVAs described in Section IV, both independently and jointly, 
neither is significant at traditional levels (max p-value = 0.13, two-tailed). More importantly, all inferences are 
identical when including the covariates independently or jointly. This suggests that these demographic differences 
across conditions are not driving the results. Therefore, I do not discuss the difference in demographics further. 
18 When excluding those observations that missed either manipulation check question, the sample drops from 86 to 
76. Both hypothesized results are marginally significant (all p ≤ 0.06, one-tailed) after dropping those who missed a 
manipulation check question. 
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6.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for actual revenue, reported revenue, Overstate, 
and Dishonesty. Consistent with prior research, the data suggest that misreporting increases as 
compensation interdependence increases (Overstate: 1.71 vs. 1.40; Dishonesty: 0.72 vs. 0.56). 
Table 3 also shows that reported revenue, Overstate, and Dishonesty are all lowest in the Near 
Review / Low CI condition. This suggests that, of the four conditions tested, a decentralized 
control implemented in settings with low compensation interdependence results in the least 
misreporting. 
 Table 3 also reveals that the randomly generated actual revenues are highest in the Near 
Review / Low CI condition and lowest in the Far Review / High CI condition. Recall that actual 
revenue is randomly generated each round for each participant from a uniform distribution 
between $2.00 and $6.00. Therefore, on average, actual revenue should be $4.00. However, in 
both the Near Review / Low CI and Far Review / High CI conditions, total average actual 
revenue differs from $4.00 ($4.17; p = 0.12 and $3.81; p = 0.04, respectively, two-tailed t-tests). 
Given this difference, I examine the reporting patterns across all six rounds. Table 4 provides 
round-by-round detail for actual revenue and Dishonesty. In five of the six rounds, Dishonesty is 
lowest in the Near Review / Low CI condition. However, actual revenue is significantly higher 
than $4.00 in only two of the six rounds (Rounds two and six) (p = 0.02 and p = 0.08, 
respectively, two-tailed t-tests). This provides preliminary evidence that actual revenue is not 
driving the results. I also perform a series of robustness tests, described in detail later, to examine 
more fully whether differences in actual revenue explain the results.19 
19 The specific concern is within the Near Review / Low CI condition. Based on theory, I predict dishonest reporting 
to be lowest in this condition. However, because actual revenue is higher in this condition relative to the other 
conditions, less misreporting would be required to achieve to a specific economic payout. In other words, high 
actual revenue could lead to less dishonest reporting, and this could be driving the results. 
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6.3 Hypotheses Tests 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that greater control centralization negatively influences employees’ 
subjective assessment of detection likelihood. To test this hypothesis, I run an ANOVA with 
Compensation Interdependence and Control Centralization as the independent variables and the 
responses to the following post-experiment question as the dependent variable: Suppose you 
were to do the same task with the same review process for six more rounds. What would you 
assess the likelihood to be that you would be selected for a review at least once in the six 
rounds? Participants could respond with any value between 0 and 100, inclusive. Table 5 
provides the results from this ANOVA. I find a significant main effect for control centralization. 
Specifically, participants in the Near Review condition assess a higher likelihood of being 
selected for a review relative to participants in the Far Review condition (33.9 percent compared 
to 23.9 percent, p = 0.03, one-tailed). This result comes through despite there being no difference 
in actual percentage of red chips relative to total chips drawn across the Near Review and Far 
Review conditions (9.3 percent compared 10.0 percent, respectively, p = 0.78, two-tailed t-test, 
non-tabulated). These findings support the hypothesis that greater spatial distance between a 
reporting manager and a control (i.e., control centralization) negatively influences employees’ 
subjective assessments of detection likelihood. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that the difference in performance misreporting between a 
centralized and decentralized control is greater when compensation interdependence is low than 
when compensation interdependence is high. To test this hypothesis, I run a linear mixed 
ANOVA model with Dishonesty as the dependent variable and Control Centralization and 
Compensation Interdependence as the independent variables. I use a mixed model to control for 
correlation resulting from repeated observations from each participant over six rounds. 
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Table 6 provides the results from the ANOVA. Consistent with prior research (Church et 
al. 2012; Maas and Van Rinsum 2013), the main effect of Compensation Interdependence on 
Dishonesty is significant (p < 0.01, one-tailed). Panel B also reveals that the interaction effect is 
significant (p = 0.04, one-tailed), consistent with Hypothesis 2. Panel C shows a lack of 
significant round effects.20 Simple effect tests shown in Panel D suggest that the interaction 
pattern is consistent with Hypothesis 2. Specifically, the effect of Control Centralization on 
Dishonesty is significant when Compensation Interdependence is low (p = 0.04, one-tailed), but 
not significant when Compensation Interdependence is high (p = 0.44, two-tailed). Figure 8 
provides a graphical representation of the results. 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that compensation interdependence has both a 
main and moderating effect on dishonest reporting. Compensation interdependence increases 
misreporting, and it also affects misreporting by reducing the effect that control centralization 
has on misreporting.21 
6.4 Mediation Analysis 
6.4.1 Subjective Detection Likelihood as a Mediator 
I perform mediation analysis to test the process underlying the observed effects. I use the 
regression approach of mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986) with Control Centralization 
as the independent variable, Average Dishonesty as the dependent variable, and Subjective 
20 I use a multi-period experiment to examine whether participants revised their reporting decision as they received 
more information about the control’s effectiveness through seeing the number of red and white chips drawn each 
round. The lack of significant round effects suggests that participants did not receive information during the session 
that significantly influenced their reporting decision. I interpret this as evidence that participants were able to make a 
relatively accurate subjective assessment of the ratio of red and white chips during the review demonstration when 
they had a chance to estimate how many red and white chips were in the bowl. This is consistence with my findings 
from my pilot study. 
21 I perform the same mixed ANOVA using Overstate as the dependent variable. Results for the test of Hypothesis 2 
are inferentially similar but weaker (p = 0.06, one-tailed t-test). I also run a random-effect ordered logistic model 
using an indicator variable coded one if a participant misreported and zero otherwise as the dependent variable. 
Results are inferentially similar but weaker (p = 0.07, one-tailed t-test) using the indicator dependent variable. 
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Detection Likelihood as the mediator. I perform mediation analysis for both the High CI and Low 
CI conditions separately to observe how the mediation differs across the two subsamples.22 
Figure 9 presents the results of these mediation analyses. Panel A contains the High CI 
subsample, and Panel B contains the Low CI subsample. 
 In both the High CI and the Low CI subsamples, the link between Control Centralization 
and Detection Likelihood is marginally significant, consistent with Hypothesis 1 (p = 0.07 and p 
= 0.08, one-tailed, respectively). In the High CI subsample, the link between Subjective 
Detection Likelihood and Average Dishonesty is not significant (p = 0.42, one-tailed), while it is 
marginally significant in the Low CI subsample (p = 0.08, one-tailed). Moreover, while no 
mediation occurs in the High CI subsample, a Sobel-Goodman test shows that Subjective 
Detection Likelihood mediates 17 percent of the total effect that Control Centralization has on 
Average Dishonesty in the Low CI subsample. Specifically, the coefficient and associated p-
values go from 0.14 (p = 0.04, one-tailed) to 0.11 (p = 0.07 one-tailed), suggesting partial 
mediation. This evidence further supports Hypothesis 2 and suggests that, although participants 
perceive detection likelihood to be greater with decentralized controls, compensation 
interdependence reduces the effect that control centralization has on dishonest reporting.  
6.4.2 Perception of Others’ Misreporting Behavior as a Mediator 
 The mediation analysis shown in Figure 9 provides some evidence of the cognitive 
process underlying the interaction. However, subjective detection likelihood mediates only a 
small portion of the total effect that control centralization has on misreporting in the Low CI 
22 I also perform bootstrapped moderated mediation as suggested in model 14 of Hayes (2013). In this model, 
compensation interdependence moderates the effect between the mediator (perceived detection likelihood) and the 
dependent variable (average dishonesty). Results using 1,000 replications are inferentially identical to those 
presented in the paper. Specifically, compensation interdependence moderates the relation between the mediator and 
the dependent variable such that higher levels of compensation interdependence results in a less significant relation 
between these two variables.  
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subsample. As such, I perform an additional mediation analysis to understand whether another 
cognitive process underlies the interaction. 
 Control centralization could also affect misreporting by creating an environment in which 
individuals perceive others to be misreporting, increasing their own propensity to misreport. 
Specifically, control centralization could have different effects on the perceived descriptive norm 
for or against misreporting. Descriptive norms are beliefs about what is being done by most other 
members of a social group (Lapinski and Rimal 2005). If descriptive norms suggest others are 
misreporting, it could increase an individual’s propensity to misreport. 
To measure the perception that others are misreporting, I ask participants four post-
experiment questions: (1) In how many rounds do you think your partner overstated his or her 
revenue? (2) Across all rounds, by how much do you think your partner overstated his or her 
revenue? (3) In how many rounds do you think an average participant in this session overstated 
his or her revenue? (4) Across all rounds, by how much do you think an average participant 
overstated his or her revenue? Participants answered all four questions using a seven point 
Likert Scale with higher values indicating a higher perception that others were misreporting.23 I 
run a principal component analysis on the responses to the four questions, which yields one 
factor with an eigenvalue greater than one. This factor, which I label Misreporting Norm, 
explains 63 percent of the total variance (Eigenvalue = 2.51) and each of the four questions has a 
loading score greater than 0.46.24  
23 Each question had the endpoints on the Likert Scale response labeled. For questions one and three, the endpoints 
were No rounds and Every round. For questions two and four, the end points were Not at all and A large amount. 
There was no label on the midpoints. 
24 The mean for Misreporting Norm across the four conditions is: Near Review / High CI = 0.18; Near Review / Low 
CI = -0.85; Far Review / High CI = 0.28; Far Review / Low CI = 0.20. 
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To examine whether a perceived descriptive norm is driving misreporting, I perform a 
Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation analysis with Control Centralization as the independent 
variable, Average Dishonesty as the dependent variable, and Misreporting Norm as the mediator. 
I split my sample based on High CI and Low CI to observe how the mediation is different across 
the two subsamples. Figure 10 provides the results from this mediation analysis. 
The results show that control centralization has no effect on the perception that others 
were misreporting in the High CI subsample (p = 0.84, two-tailed). However, in the Low CI 
subsample, participants perceived others were misreporting more with a centralized control than 
a decentralized control (p = 0.02, two-tailed). In both subsamples, a greater perception that others 
are misreporting is associated with higher individual dishonest reporting (both p ≤ 0.02, two-
tailed). Moreover, while no mediation occurs in the High CI subsample, in the Low CI 
subsample, a Sobel-Goodman test reveals that Misreporting Norm mediates 66 percent of the 
direct effect from control centralization to average dishonesty. Specifically, the coefficient drops 
from 0.14 (p = 0.08, two-tailed) to 0.05 (p = 0.50, two-tailed). This evidence suggests that 
control centralization has a greater influence on the perception that others are misreporting and 
subsequent reporting behavior as compensation interdependence decreases.  
6.5 Robustness Checks 
 Recall from Table 3 that Dishonesty is lowest in the Near Review / Low CI condition, but 
actual revenue is also highest in that condition. To ensure that differences in actual revenue do 
not explain the results, I perform a series of robustness checks. First, I run a mixed model with 
Dishonesty as the dependent variable, Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence 
as the independent variables and Actual Revenue as a covariate. Table 7 reveals that inferences 
are unchanged when controlling for actual revenue. Specifically, the main effect of compensation 
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interdependence and the interaction effect are both still significant at conventional levels (p < 
0.01 and p = 0.03, respectively, one-tailed).  
 One potential problem with including actual revenue as a covariate is that it introduces 
actual revenue to both sides of the equation underlying the ANOVA model. Specifically, because 
the dependent variable is (Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue)/(Max Revenue – Actual 
Revenue) and Actual Revenue is a covariate, actual revenue is present in the equation on both 
sides. This can lead to specification errors. I perform a second test to mitigate this issue. 
 I classify all observations by actual revenue into one of eight $0.50 increment bins. For 
example, bin 1 contains all observations with actual revenue between $2.00 and $2.49, bin 2 
contains all observations with actual revenue between $2.50 and $2.99 and so on. Figure 11 
provides a bar chart of the actual revenue in each bin across each of the four conditions. The red 
line in Figure 11 indicates the number of observations in each bin given a uniform actual revenue 
distribution. Figure 11 reveals that the relatively high average actual revenue in the Near Review 
/ Low CI condition is the result of a small number of actual revenues between $2.00 and $2.49 
(Bin 1) and a large number of actual revenues between $5.50 and $6.00 (Bin 8). Therefore, I run 
a mixed model ANOVA with Dishonesty as the dependent variable and Control Centralization 
and Compensation Interdependence as the independent variables excluding all observations in 
Bin 1 and Bin 8. After dropping these observations, the average actual revenue in the Near 
Review / Low CI condition is no longer significantly different from $4.00 ($4.03, p = 0.78, two-
tailed t-test, non-tabulated). Table 8 provides the result of this test. The main effect for 
compensation interdependence is still marginally significant (p = 0.09, one-tailed), and the 
predicted interaction effect is significant (p = 0.05, one-tailed). This suggests that the results are 
robust to controlling for the effect that actual revenue has on reporting behavior. 
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CHAPTER 7: ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 
 In this section, I discuss the results of additional analyses designed to test the robustness 
of my findings. I first examine how robust my findings are to different specifications of the 
dependent variable.  
7.1 Robustness of Dependent Variable 
7.1.1 Overstate 
 I define Overstate as Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue. This variable differs from 
Dishonesty, my main variable of interest in that it does not consider to what extent a participant 
could misreport. For example, a participant who reported $6.00 of revenue after receiving actual 
revenue of $5.99 is the same as a participant who reported $3.01 of revenue after receiving actual 
revenue of $3.00. 
 To test the robustness of my findings, I perform a mixed ANOVA with Compensation 
Interdependence and Control Centralization as my independent variables and Overstate as my 
dependent variable. Table 9 provides the results from this analysis. The interaction remains 
marginally significant at traditional levels (p = 0.06, one-tailed). Additionally, the simple main 
effect of Control Centralization is significant when Compensation Interdependence is low (p = 
0.02, two-tailed) and not significant when Compensation Interdependence is high (p = 0.53, two-
tailed). Overall, this suggests that my findings are robust to using Overstate as the dependent 
variable. 
7.1.2 Likelihood of Misreporting 
 Misreport is an indicator variable coded one if a participant overstated their reported 
revenue and zero otherwise. Therefore, this analysis does not consider the extent to which a 
participant misreported, just whether the participant did or did not misreport.  
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 To test the robustness of my findings using an indicator variable as the dependent 
variable, I perform a logistic regression with Misreport as the dependent variable and 
Compensation Interdependence, Control Centralization, and the interaction of these two 
variables as the independent variables. Table 10 provides the results of this analysis. Panel A 
reveals that participants were least likely to misreport when compensation interdependence is 
low and the control is decentralized. This is consistent with my findings using both Dishonesty 
and Overstate. 
 Panel B also suggests a pattern consistent with the results for both Dishonest and 
Overstate. Because I run a logistic regression, the effects are all relative to the low compensation 
interdependence and Near Review condition.25 Plotting out the pattern of results by using the 
coefficient of each line in the logistic regression reveals a pattern consistent with the ANOVA 
tests. Moreover, the interaction effect is marginally significant (p = 0.06, one-tailed), supporting 
Hypothesis 2. This suggests that the results are robust to using an indicator variable. 
7.2 Robustness of Hypothesis 1 Tests 
7.2.1 Participants Selected for a Review 
In this section, I test potential alternative explanations for why I find support for my first 
hypothesis. Recall that Hypothesis 1 predicts that participants perceive the detection likelihood 
of a control to be greater with a relatively decentralized control than with a relatively centralized 
control. However, an alternative explanation is that more participants were selected for a review 
(i.e., had a red chip drawn) in the Near Review conditions relative to the Far Review conditions. 
To examine this alternative explanation, I first examine whether there is a significant difference 
in the subjective detection likelihood question for those participants selected for a review 
25 In this condition, both the indicator variables (compensation interdependence and control centralization) are set at 
zero. This becomes the intercept of the logistic regression and all effects are measured relative to that point. 
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compared to those participants not selected. Within my sample, 44 participants did not have a red 
chip drawn during any of the six rounds while 42 participants had at least one red chip drawn 
during the six rounds. When testing participants’ responses to the perceive detection likelihood 
question across these two groups, I find, although close, no difference at traditional levels (24.5 
percent versus 31.9 percent respectively, p = 0.14, two-tailed, non-tabulated).  
I then examine each subsample in more detail. I first examine the 44 participants who did 
not have a red chip drawn during any of the six rounds. Within this subsample, there is a 
relatively equal split of participants in the Near Review condition (n = 20) and in the Far Review 
condition (n = 24). Participants in the Near Review condition assessed the detection likelihood 
higher than participants in the Far Review condition, although the difference in the two means is 
not statistically significant (26.9 percent versus 22.5 percent, p = 0.42, two-tailed, non-
tabulated). 
 I then examine the 42 participants who had at least one red chip drawn during the six 
rounds. Within this subsample, there are fewer participants in the Near Review condition (n = 16) 
than in the Far Review condition (n = 26). Participants in the Near Review condition assessed the 
detection likelihood higher than participants in the Far Review condition, (42.6 percent versus 
25.3 percent, p = 0.05, two-tailed, non-tabulated). This would suggest that most of the variation 
in participants’ responses to this question is coming from those participants selected for a review. 
I further examine whether a significant difference exists in the number of individuals who 
had multiple red chips drawn during the six rounds. Four participants in the Far Review 
condition and three participants in the Near Review condition had more than one red poker chip 
drawn during the six rounds. I investigate how the responses from those participants selected 
multiple times differed from those selected a single time. In both the Far Review and Near 
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Review condition, those participants selected multiple times assessed a lower probability of being 
selected in the future than those participants selected a single time, although the difference was 
not statistically significant (26.7 percent versus 17.5 percent, p = 0.49, two-tailed and 45.5 
percent versus 30 percent, p = 0.44, two-tailed). 
This evidence suggests that those participants who had no red chips or multiple red chips 
drawn during the session do not appear to be driving the results supporting my first hypothesis. 
Those selected for one review drive most of the variation. It is interesting to note that selection 
for a review could make the centralization manipulation more salient, and I cannot fully rule out 
that salience of the manipulation driven by review selection is partially driving my results. 
7.2.2 Alternative Specification of Likelihood Detection. 
Recall that I asked the following question to measure likelihood detection: Suppose you 
were to do the same task with the same review process for six more rounds. What would you 
assess the likelihood to be that you would be selected for a review at least once in the six 
rounds? In addition to this question, I also asked participants Within each individual round, what 
did you assess the likelihood of being selected for a review to be? (0% - 100%). In this section, I 
describe the results of my first hypothesis using this question to measure the subjective 
likelihood of detection. For this subsection, I refer to participants’ responses to the first question 
as Session Review and their response to the second question as Round Review. 
I first examine the correlation between Session Review and Round Review. The 
correlation between the measures is 0.24, which is significant at the 0.03 level. However, when 
performing a two-tailed t-test, I find evidence that only is directionally consistent with my first 
hypothesis. Specifically, the mean of Round Review is higher for those participants in the Near 
55 
 
Review condition than those in the Far Review condition; however, this difference is not 
statistically significant (14.7 percent vs 14.3 percent, p = 0.92, two-tailed, non-tabulated).  
I examine why I observe a difference between Session Review and Round Review. I note 
that the standard deviation of Session Review is higher than the standard deviation for Round 
Review. I perform a variance ratio test to compare the standard deviations of these two variables. 
For this test, I divide the standard deviation of Session Review by the standard deviation of 
Round Review and I compare the resulting ratio to one. I find that the result of the variance ratio 
test is significantly different from one, suggesting that the standard deviations are significantly 
different from each other. Specifically, the standard deviation of Session Review is significantly 
higher than the standard deviation of Round Review (28.1 vs. 14.5, p < 0.01, two-tailed). This 
suggests that the Round Review question did not provide the participants enough variation in 
their responses to capture the difference that a decentralized versus centralized control created.  
 I then create composite measures combining Session Review and Round Review. The 
first composite measure I create is an average of Session Review and Round Review. Because 
both variables are percentages from 0 percent - 100 percent (the range was included in both 
questions), taking an average of the two measures is appropriate. Using this variable, which I call 
Average Review, provides results consistent with my first hypothesis. Specifically, participants 
in the Near Review condition perceive a marginally greater likelihood of being selected for a 
review than participants in the Far Review condition (24.2 percent vs. 19.1 percent, p = 0.06, 
one-tailed).  
 I create the second composite measure by running a principal component analysis (PCA) 
on Session Review and Round Review. The PCA creates a single factor (Eigenvalue = 1.24) that 
explains 62.1 percent of the variance. Both variables load positively on this factor with a 
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weighting of 0.71. The results using the single factor, which I call PCA Review, are also 
consistent with my first hypothesis. Specifically, I find that participants in the Near Review 
condition perceive a marginally greater likelihood of being selected for a review than 
participants in the Far Review condition (0.19 vs. -0.13, p = 0.10, one-tailed). This suggests that 
the results of Hypothesis 1 are marginally robust to different composite specifications of the 
variable used to measure subjective detection likelihood. 
7.3 Robustness of Hypothesis 2 Tests 
 The focus of my second hypothesis is the interactive effect that control centralization and 
compensation interdependence have on dishonest reporting. My theory suggests that participants 
in the Near Review/Low CI condition engage in the lowest level of dishonest reporting. However, 
there could be alternative reasons why misreporting in that condition is lower than the other three 
conditions. In this subsection, I explore potential alternative explanations for my findings. 
7.3.1 Robustness of Results across Rounds 
 I first examine the pattern of results within each of the six rounds. I am interested in 
determining if a single round is driving my results or if my results are consistent across all 
rounds. Figure 12 provides a graph of Dishonesty across the six rounds. 
 My theory predicts that less misreporting will occur with a decentralized control than a 
centralized control when compensation interdependence is low. I find a pattern of results 
directionally consistent with this prediction in five of the six rounds. The fourth round is the only 
round in which this pattern does not hold. In this round, a decentralized control has slightly more 
misreporting than a centralized control in the Low CI condition (0.55 vs. 0.53), although the 
difference is not statistically significant. 
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 My theory also predicts that the difference in misreporting between a decentralized and 
centralized control will be greater when compensation interdependence is low than when it is 
high. I find a pattern consistent with this prediction in four out of the six rounds. When looking 
at the pattern of results across the six rounds, they all seem relatively consistent except the first 
and fourth rounds. In the first round, I find a significant main effect for control centralization 
given low compensation interdependence, as predicted. However, I also find a significant main 
effect for control centralization given high compensation interdependence that is opposite of 
what I would expect. Specifically, misreporting is higher with a decentralized control than a 
centralized control (0.82 vs. 0.48, p = 0.01, two-tailed). I perform additional tests on the first 
round results, described in detail later to examine further this finding.  
In the fourth round, I find no simple main effects for control centralization given either 
high or low compensation interdependence. Therefore, my results appear not to be robust to the 
fourth round. Given my lack of a theoretical prediction as to why the fourth round would be any 
different from all other rounds, I attribute this null result to simple statistical properties that 
suggest doing the same test multiple times will create at least some null results. 
7.3.2 Robustness of Results Excluding First Round 
 As mentioned in the previous subsection, the first round had an unexpected result. Recall 
that there was a simple main effect for control centralization given high compensation 
interdependence. However, the direction of this simple main effect was opposite of what I would 
expect. Specifically, Dishonesty was higher in the Near Review condition than in the Far Review 
condition when compensation interdependence was high (0.82 vs. 0.48, p = 0.01, two-tailed). I 
first examine potential reasons for this finding and, then, investigate whether my results change 
when excluding the first round. 
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 I first examine whether including Actual Revenue in the ANOVA as a covariate changes 
the first round results. The effect of Actual Revenue is significant in the model (p = 0.01, two-
tailed). However, the interaction effect is still significant (p = 0.01, two-tailed). Moreover, the 
simple main effect of Control Centralization given high compensation interdependence becomes 
weaker, but remains significant at traditional levels (p = 0.04, two-tailed). This suggests that the 
actual revenues generated in the first round are partially, but not fully, driving the simple effect. 
Given that this pattern occurred in the first round, before participants had seen their partner’s 
first reported revenue and before the first review, I am unable to brainstorm what else could be 
driving this result. Given my inability to explicate why this pattern shows up in the first round, I 
examine whether my inferences remain unchanged if I exclude the first round. 
 Dropping the first round of observations reduces my sample size from 516 to 430 
observations (86 participants * 5 observations). I rerun the ANOVA using this smaller sample 
size and compare these results to the results from my full sample. Excluding the first round 
decreases the significance of the interaction (p = 0.15, one-tailed). However, using the contrast 
codes described in Section 7.4, the interaction remains significant (p = 0.01, one-tailed). 
Moreover, the simple main effect of Control Centralization given low compensation 
interdependence remains significant (p = 0.05, two-tailed) while the simple main effect of 
control centralization given high compensation interdependence is not significant (p = 0.95, two-
tailed). This suggests that my results are somewhat consistent when excluding the first round. 
7.3.3 Robustness of Results Controlling for Partner’s Report 
 My experimental design allowed participants to see the reported revenue of another 
participant in their session. z-Tree randomly selected a partner for each individual, and the 
partner remained the same through all six rounds. It is possible that a participant’s decision to 
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misreport was only a function of their partner’s reported revenue and not the control design. I 
examine this proposition by controlling for participants’ partner’s reported revenue. Specifically, 
I run a mixed ANCOVA with Dishonesty as the dependent variable and Control Centralization 
and Compensation Interdependence as the independent variables. I include the partner’s reported 
revenue as a covariate. The control variable for the partners’ reported revenue is a lagged 
variable. Specifically, because participants see their partner’s reporting decision after they have 
made their own reporting decision, any influence that their partner’s reported revenue has will 
occur in the subsequent round. Therefore, because participants made the first reporting decision 
prior to seeing their partner’s reported revenue, I exclude this round. Thus, this test is a joint test 
of both the effect of the partners’ reported revenue and the effect of control centralization and 
compensation interdependence on misreporting, excluding the first round.  
 Evidence from this test suggests that the combined effects of controlling for partners’ 
reported revenue and dropping the first round does significantly change my results. Specifically, 
the interaction predicted in Hypothesis 2 is no longer supported (p = 0.24, one-tailed). Given that 
this test is a joint test, I perform additional tests to better understand what is driving this 
significant change in my inferences. Specifically, I rerun the analysis keeping the first round of 
data. For the partner’s reported revenue in the first round, I put in $4.84. This was the fixed 
amount that all participants were informed that their partner reported in the practice round.26 
Since this number was consistent across all conditions, the extent to which it influenced 
reporting decisions should be the same across conditions. 
26 Participants were informed that their actual partner did not report this number. Specifically, they were told that the 
$4.84 was being reported to all participants so everyone would have a similar experience during the practice round. 
In other words, participants were not deceived into thinking that the reported revenue in the practice round was 
generated by their partner when, in fact, it was not.  
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 I re-run the mixed ANCOVA with dishonesty as the dependent variable and control 
centralization and compensation interdependence as the independent variables and the 
participants’ partner’s reported revenue as a covariate. As mentioned, the covariate variable now 
includes $4.84 for all observations in the first round instead of a null value, which allows me to 
use all six rounds. Results from the mixed ANCOVA are consistent with my prediction, although 
weaker. Specifically, I find that the interaction is marginally significant (p = 0.06, one-tailed), 
indicating that controlling for participants’ partner’s reported revenue does somewhat decrease 
the significance of my findings. However, it does not qualitatively change my results such that 
my inferences would change. Therefore, the data do not support the alternative explanation that 
seeing another participant’s reported revenue solely drives reporting behavior. 
7.3.4 Robustness of Results Controlling for Cost of Misreporting 
 I intentionally designed my experiment to minimize the cost of misreporting. For 
example, although participants were able to see if the facilitator drew a red poker chip for each 
participant in the session, they did not know the outcome of the review for other participants. 
Specifically, they did not know if the individual who had the red chip drawn misreported or not. 
Therefore, the perceived cost of detection (i.e., having a red poker chip drawn) should be 
minimal across all conditions. However, it is possible that participants in the Near Review 
condition perceived higher cost associated with detected misreporting because the facilitator was 
physically closer to them relative to participants in the Far Review condition. Therefore, it is 
possible that differences in the perceived cost of misreporting could be driving my results. I 
anticipated this concern and asked three post-experiment questions designed to measure 
participants’ perceived cost of misreporting. I describe these questions and my results when 
controlling for participants’ perceived cost of misreporting in the next two subsections. 
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7.3.4.1 Perceived Monetary Cost 
 Although the actual monetary cost for being caught misreporting does not differ across 
conditions, it is possible that participants perceived differences across the High CI and Low CI 
conditions. To examine the potential effect that differences in perceived monetary cost has on 
misreporting, I ask participants the following post-experiment question: With respect to your 
total earnings, how costly would it have been if you had overstated revenue and were selected 
for a review in the same round? Participants responded using a 7-point Likert Scale with higher 
values indicating higher perceived monetary cost associated with being caught misreporting.27  
 I find no difference in the perceived monetary cost of misreporting across the High CI 
and Low CI conditions (4.47 vs. 4.31, p = 0.72, two-tailed). Interestingly, I do find a significant 
difference in participants’ response to this question across the Far Review and Near Review 
conditions. Specifically, participants in the Near Review perceived higher monetary cost 
associated with being caught misreporting than participants in the Far Review condition (5.00 vs. 
3.96, p = 0.02, two-tailed). This finding is somewhat surprising, and I describe what I believe is 
driving this result in subsection 7.3.4.3. 
  Given that I find a significant difference in perceived monetary cost across the Far 
Review / Near Review conditions, I examine whether perceived monetary cost is driving my 
results for either Hypothesis 1 or 2. To examine the effect that perceived monetary cost is having 
on Hypothesis 1, I run an ANCOVA with Detection Likelihood as my dependent variable and 
Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence as my independent variables while 
controlling for perceived monetary cost. The results from this ANCOVA suggest that perceived 
monetary cost is a significant predictor of perceived detection likelihood (p = 0.05, two-tailed). 
27 The end points were labeled “Not at all costly” and “Very costly.” The midpoint was not labeled. 
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Specifically, as participants perceive greater monetary cost associated with misreporting 
detection, they perceive the detection likelihood of the control to be greater. Controlling for the 
effect of perceived monetary cost also increases the significance of control centralization on 
perceived detection likelihood (p = 0.01, two-tailed). Therefore, although perceived monetary 
cost predicts perceived detection likelihood, it does not change the fact that participants in the 
Near Review condition perceived the control to be more likely to detect misreporting than do 
participants in the Far Review condition. 
 I also examine whether perceived monetary cost is driving my results for my second 
hypothesis. To examine this, I run a mixed ANCOVA with Dishonesty as the dependent variable 
and Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence as the independent variables 
while controlling for perceived monetary cost of misreporting. I find that my results are 
inferentially consistent when including perceived monetary cost as a covariate. Specifically, the 
perceived monetary cost of misreporting is close, but not significant at traditional levels in the 
ANCOVA model (p = 0.16, two-tailed). Moreover, the interaction predicted by Hypothesis 2 
remains significant (p = 0.04, one-tailed). Therefore, it does not appear that differences in the 
perceived monetary cost of misreporting are driving my results for either H1 or H2. 
7.3.4.2 Perceived Social Cost 
 It is also possible that the perceived social cost of being caught misreporting could be 
driving my results. I designed my experiment to minimize the social cost associated with 
misreporting. For example, the other participants in the session did not know if a participant who 
had a red chip drawn had misreported or had reported honestly. In fact, the only person who 
knew this information was the facilitator of the experiment, and he kept a neutral face upon 
discovering if a participant had or had not misreported. Despite the experimental design, 
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participants could perceive differences in the social cost associated with being caught 
misreporting. For example, participants could perceive detection to be more socially costly when 
the facilitator was standing relatively close as opposed to when he was far away.  
 To examine the effect that differences in the perceived social cost of misreporting has on 
misreporting behavior, I asked participants two post-experiment questions. With respect to your 
reputation, how costly would it have been if you had overstated revenue and were selected for a 
review in the same round and With respect to social cost (e.g., shame, embarrassment), how 
costly would it have been if you had overstated revenue and were selected for a review in the 
same round. Participants responded using a 7-point Likert Scale with higher values indicating a 
higher perceived social cost associated with being caught misreporting.28  
 I first examine the correlation between participants’ responses to these two questions. I 
find that these two questions have a high positive correlation (0.81). Given this high correlation, 
I combine these two variables to create a single composite variable. To do this, I run a PCA 
using the two variables. The PCA yields a single factor that explains 90.2 percent of the total 
variance (eigenvalue = 1.81). I label this factor PCA Social.  
 I then examine whether PCA Social differs across experimental conditions. I find that 
perceived social cost does not differ across the High CI and Low CI conditions (p = 0.41, two-
tailed), but does differ across the Near Review and Far Review conditions (p = 0.08, two-tailed). 
This suggests that, despite my efforts to design the experiment so that the social cost of 
misreporting did not differ across conditions, the control centralization manipulation did 
influence participants’ perceptions of the social cost of being caught misreporting. 
28 The end points were labeled “Not at all costly” and “Very costly.” The midpoint was not labeled. 
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 I investigate whether my results are robust to including perceived social cost as a 
covariate. To test the robustness of Hypothesis 1, I run an ANCOVA with Detection Likelihood 
as my dependent variable, Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence as my 
independent variables, and PCA Social as a covariate. I find PCA Social is not a significant 
predictor of Detection Likelihood (p = 0.62, two-tailed). Moreover, Control Centralization 
remains a significant predictor of Detection Likelihood (p = 0.02, one-tailed). Thus, the results 
for Hypothesis 1 are robust to including the perceived social cost of detection as a covariate. 
 I also examine whether perceived social cost of detection is driving the results supporting 
my second hypothesis. To examine this, I run a mixed ANCOVA with Dishonesty as the 
dependent variable, Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence as my 
independent variables, and PCA Social as a covariate. I find that my results are inferentially 
consistent when including PCA Social as a covariate. Specifically, PCA Social is close, but not 
significant at traditional levels in the ANCOVA model (p = 0.13, two-tailed). Moreover, the 
interaction predicted by Hypothesis 2 remains significant (p = 0.03, one-tailed). Therefore, it 
does not appear that differences in the perceived social cost of detection are driving my results 
for Hypothesis 2. 
 Overall, my results are robust to including controls for both the perceived monetary and 
social cost of detection individually. I also examine whether including both social and monetary 
cost variables concurrently changes my inferences. It does not. Specifically, Control 
Centralization is still a significant predictor of Detection Likelihood (p = 0.01, one-tailed), and 
the interaction effect predicted in Hypothesis 2 is still significant (p = 0.03, one-tailed). 
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7.3.4.3 Discussion on Perceived Cost of Misreporting  
I find that the perceived social cost of detection differs across the Near Review and Far 
Review conditions. Specifically, participants perceived higher social cost when the facilitator was 
standing relatively close to them. This suggests that proximal controls not only influence 
employees’ subjective assessment of detection likelihood, but also their perceived social cost of 
misreporting. Therefore, the use of decentralized controls can change employee behavior through 
multiple processes.  
 Interestingly, I also find that the perceived monetary cost of detection is higher with a 
decentralized control than a centralized control. I observe this difference although there was no 
actual difference in the monetary cost of misreported performance across conditions. I attribute 
this finding to participants having difficulty separating the social cost of detection from the 
monetary cost of detection. For example, prior research has documented that individuals have a 
difficult time separating affective considerations from financial considerations in an investing 
setting (Elliott et al. 2014). Consistent with that study, I contend that participants had a difficult 
time separating the monetary cost of detection from the social cost of detection. Therefore, 
because the social cost of detection was higher given a decentralized control than a centralized 
control, participants also assigned a higher monetary cost of detection in the Near Review 
condition than the Far Review condition. 
7.4 Contrast Coding 
 I also consider how my results change using a contrast code based on my theoretical 
predictions. The contrast code I select to use is {-3, -1, 2, 2} with the code corresponding to the 
following conditions: {Near Review/Low CI, Far Review/Low CI, Near Review/High CI, Far 
Review/High CI}. This contrast coding is appropriate given my prediction of a simple main 
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effect of control centralization when compensation interdependence is low (Near Review/Low CI 
< Far Review/Low CI), a lack of a simple main effect when compensation interdependence is 
high (Near Review/High CI = Far Review/High CI), and a main effect for compensation 
interdependence documented in prior literature (High CI > Low CI). 
 Results for my interaction using all three dependent variables become stronger. The p-
value of the interaction using Dishonest (Overstate) [Misreport] drops to two-tailed p-values of p 
< 0.01 (p = 0.01) [p < 0.01]. This suggests that a contrast code based on my theoretical 
predictions strengthens the results supporting Hypothesis 2.  
7.5 Pattern of Reviews across Sessions and Rounds 
 Another potential alternative explanation for my results is that the pattern of red chips 
drawn across experimental conditions differed significantly. The specific concern is whether the 
number of red chips differed significantly across the Near Review / Far Review conditions. This 
is a concern because the design of my experiment necessitated that this manipulation take place 
across sessions as opposed to within sessions. Therefore, if participants in the Near Review 
condition saw a different number or pattern of red chips than participants in the Far Review 
condition, it could influence my results for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. 
 I first compare the number of red chips drawn per number of participants across the Near 
Review and Far Review conditions. In the Near Review condition, there were 300 poker chips 
drawn (50 participants * 6 rounds). Of the 300 poker chips selected, 30 were red. Therefore, the 
“hit rate” of red poker chips drawn in the Near Review condition is 10.0 percent. In the Far 
Review condition, there were 216 poker chips drawn (36 participants * 6 rounds). Of the 216 
poker chips selected, 20 were red. Therefore, the “hit rate” of red poker chips drawn in the Far 
Review condition is 9.3 percent. I perform an odds ratio test to compare these two ratios across 
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the Near Review and Far Review conditions. The odds ratio test suggest that there is no 
significant difference between the two ratios (chi-square = 0.08, p > chi-square 0.78). 
 I next perform an odds ratio test for each round to determine if a significant difference 
exists between the ratio of red chips to total chips across the Near Review and Far Review 
conditions in any of the six round. Table 11 provides the ratio of red chips to total poker chips 
drawn across condition by rounds and the result of the odds ratio test for each round. In half the 
rounds, the ratio of red poker chips to total poker chips drawn is greater in the Near Review 
condition than in the Far Review condition. In the other three rounds, the ratio of red poker chips 
to total poker chips drawn is greater in the Far Review condition than in the Near Review 
condition. In only one round (round 3) does the ratio of red chips to total poker chips drawn 
significantly differ across the Far Review and Near Review conditions at traditional levels. 
I examine how this difference in ratio of red chips to total poker chips drawn in the third 
round affects the reporting decisions in the next round (i.e., round 4). Given that there is a 
significantly higher ratio of red chips drawn in the Far Review condition than the Near Review 
condition, one would expect significantly less misreporting in Round 4 because participants 
perceived a higher number of red chips to be in the bowl of poker chips. However, the pattern of 
misreporting in Round 4 does not suggest that the ratio difference influenced misreporting. 
Specifically, there is no statistical difference in Dishonesty across the Near Review and Far 
Review conditions in Round 4. This suggests that a significant difference in the ratio of red chips 
to total chips drawn across the Near Review and Far Review conditions does not appear to be 
driving my results. 
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7.6 Other Manipulation Check Question 
To measure whether participants attended to the control centralization manipulation I 
asked participants: During the session, where did the reviews take place? Participants were able 
to select between the two choices: at each participant's desk or at the front of the room. Forty-
nine of the 54 participants (91 percent) correctly answered the question. However, one could 
argue that this question serves as a recall question instead of a manipulation check question. I 
consider this point in this subsection. 
Psychological distance theory predicts that changes in one component of psychological 
distance will cause the other components of psychological distance to similarly change. Relevant 
to this study, as the spatial distance between the review and the reporting individual increases 
(decreases), the perceived hypotheticality of the review increases (decreases). Therefore, 
participants’ responses to the perceived detection likelihood question serve as a manipulation 
check. Specifically, by observing a significant difference in the perceived detection likelihood 
question across the Far Review and Near Review conditions in the predicted manner, I feel 
confident that participants attended to the manipulation. I gain further comfort from the 
robustness checks I performed through which the effect of Control Centralization on Detection 
Likelihood remained significant. 
I also examine how participants’ perceptions of the control change across the Near 
Review and Far Review conditions. Construal level theory predicts that as psychological distance 
increases (decreases) between an individual and an object or event, the object or event will be 
viewed more abstractly (concretely). Therefore, participants in the Near Review condition should 
have a relatively more concrete perception of the control than do participants in the Far Review 
condition. One way prior literature has measured difference in abstract and concrete perceptions 
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is through classification exercises (e.g., Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope and Algom 2007). 
Specifically, participants who have a relatively abstract (concrete) perception of an object or 
event tend to classify the object or event as belonging to relatively more (fewer) categories. 
As a second manipulation check, I ask participants a post-experiment question in which 
they “consider how an internal control similar to the review process in today’s session would be 
classified within a firm.” Participants had a list of six types of control categories and definitions 
of each category. They could classify the control in as many categories as they wanted. Three of 
these control categories are the control classifications used by COSO to describe control 
activities (preventative, detective, and corrective). I compare the average number of COSO 
control categories that participants used to classify the control across the Near Review and Far 
Review conditions. If greater psychological distance exists in the Far Review condition than the 
Near Review condition, participants in the Far Review condition should have a more abstract 
view of the control and, therefore, classify it using more COSO categories than participants in 
the Near Review. 
Results from this test suggest that participants in the Far Review condition classify the 
review using an average of 1.70 COSO control categories while participants in the Near Review 
condition classify the review using an average of 1.47 COSO control categories. The difference 
between these two values is significant at traditional levels (p = 0.05, two-tailed). This finding 
provides additional support that participants attended to the control centralization manipulation. 
It also provides further evidence that psychological distance theory is underlying the results 
supporting Hypothesis 1. 
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7.7 Mediation Analysis 
 To provide evidence of my theory, I perform a mediation analysis. In this section, I 
provide more detail about the different mediation analyses I perform. 
7.7.1 Mediation Using Perceived Detection Likelihood 
I first use the regression approach of mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986) with 
Control Centralization as the independent variable, Average Dishonesty as the dependent 
variable, and Detection Likelihood as the mediator. I split my sample based on High CI and Low 
CI to observe how the mediation is different across the two subsamples. Figure 9 presents the 
results of the mediation analysis. Panel A contains the High CI subsample and Panel B contains 
the Low CI subsample. I discussed these results in Section 6.4.1.  
I also perform bootstrapped moderated mediation as suggested in Model 14 of Hayes 
(2013). In this model, compensation interdependence moderates the effect between the mediator 
(perceived detection likelihood) and the dependent variable (average dishonesty). I bootstrap 
using 1,000 replications to check the robustness of my results. Panel A of Figure 13 provides the 
results from the model.  
I find that the link from Control Centralization to Detection Likelihood is negative and 
significant (p = 0.03, one-tailed). This suggests that as a control goes from a decentralized 
control to a centralized control, the perceived detection likelihood decreases, consistent with my 
first hypothesis. I also find the link from perceived detection likelihood to average dishonesty is 
negative and marginally significant, suggesting that higher perceived detection likelihood led 
participants to be less dishonest in their reporting. The path from compensation interdependence 
to average dishonesty is positive, but not statistically significant (p = 0.17, one-tailed). This 
implies that, inconsistent with prior literature, compensation interdependence does not have a 
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direct effect on dishonest reporting when the mediators are present. I also find that the 
moderation path is positive, but insignificant at traditional levels (p = 0.11, one-tailed). 
Specifically, as compensation interdependence increases, it makes the link between detection 
likelihood and average dishonesty more positive. However, ceteris paribus, this relation is 
negative. Therefore, increased compensation interdependence weakens the association between 
detection likelihood and average dishonesty, consistent with the second hypothesis. 
 I then examine whether the mediated conditional indirect effects decrease as the 
moderator variable increases, consistent with recommendations on bootstrapping to examine 
moderated mediation (Preacher & Hayes 2008; Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007). Specifically, 
I predict that aggressive reporting behavior resulting from higher compensation interdependence 
decreases the significance of the path between detection likelihood and average dishonesty. 
Therefore, as the moderating variable (compensation interdependence) increases, one would 
expect less of the indirect effects to be mediated because the path between detection likelihood 
and average dishonesty is becoming less significant. 
 Panel B of Figure 13 provides the bootstrapped indirect effect coefficient, standard error, 
z-score and p-value. As Compensation Interdependence increases, mediated conditional indirect 
effects decrease. Specifically, the coefficient goes from 0.03 to 0.01 to -0.00 and the associated 
p-values become less significant as compensation interdependence increases (0.27, 0.40, 0.98). 
This evidence, taken together with the regression approach of mediation analysis, suggests that 
the perceived detection likelihood does appear to play a role in the participants’ responses to 
control centralization. Further, compensation interdependence moderates the effect that 
perceived detection likelihood has on dishonest reporting. In totality, it would appear that there is 
strong evidence of my theory in my experimental setting. 
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7.7.2 Mediation Using Perceived Social Norms 
I also perform a moderated mediation analysis using the bootstrapping technique 
suggested in model 8 of Hayes (2013) with a measure of perceived descriptive norms as the 
mediator. In this model, compensation interdependence moderates the relation between the 
independent variable (control centralization) and the dependent variable (average dishonesty). I 
then bootstrap using 1,000 replications to check the robustness of my results using the moderated 
mediation analysis. Panel A of Figure 14 provides the results from the moderated mediation 
model.  
I find that the path from control centralization to perceived descriptive norms is positive 
and significant. This suggests that as a control becomes more centralized, people perceive a 
stronger descriptive norm of misreporting. I also find a positive significant path from 
compensation interdependence to the descriptive norm of misreporting. This suggests that as 
compensation becomes interdependent, participants perceive a stronger norm of misreporting. 
However, the interaction effect of compensation interdependence and misreporting norm is 
negative, which suggests that increased compensation interdependence reduces the association 
between control centralization and misreporting norms. Specifically, it would appear that the 
direct effect of compensation interdependence reduces the significance of the path between 
control centralization and the perceived misreporting norm such that control centralization only 
affects perceived norms when compensation interdependence is low. This provides further 
evidence that control centralization is likely to reduce dishonest reporting only when 
compensation interdependence is low. 
Panel B of Figure 14 provides the bootstrapped indirect effect coefficient, standard error, 
z-score and p-value. As Compensation Interdependence increases, condition indirect effects 
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decrease. Specifically, the coefficient goes from 0.07 to 0.04 to 0.01 and the associated p-values 
reveal the mediated indirect effects decrease as compensation interdependence increases (0.08, 
0.13, 0.82). This evidence, taken together with the regression approach of mediation analysis, 
suggests that the perceived descriptive norms of misreporting appear to play a role in 
participants’ responses to control centralization. Further, compensation interdependence 
moderates the effect that control centralization has on the creation of descriptive norms. I explain 
why I believe I find this effect in the next subsection. 
7.7.3 Theoretical Support for Descriptive Norm Finding 
 I find evidence that compensation interdependence appears to reduce the effectiveness of 
control centralization in creating descriptive norms against misreporting. This is consistent with 
prior theoretical economic research that shows that under certain conditions economic incentives 
can crowd out social incentives (Huck, Kübler, and Weibull 2012). In my study, the shared 
economic incentives of misreporting and increasing compensation for both parties could have 
crowded out the motivation to adhere to any perceived descriptive norms against misreporting. 
Moreover, research in the communication field suggests that as group identity increases, 
the norms associated with the group become more salient and can crowd out other behavior-
influencing norms (Lapinski and Rimal 2005). Therefore, since compensation interdependence 
can increase group identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Chen and Li 2009), one would expect 
that as compensation interdependence increases, participants pay more attention to the perceived 
norm in their small group compared the perceived norm of the session. To examine this 
proposition, I run a separate PCA on the two post-experiment questions designed to measure the 
perception that a participant’s partner was misreporting and the two-post experiment questions 
designed to measure the perception that other participants in the session (other than their partner) 
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were misreporting. Specifically, I perform a separate PCA on questions 1 and 2 and on questions 
3 and 4 of the following questions: (1) In how many rounds do you think your partner overstated 
his or her revenue? (2) Across all rounds, by how much do you think your partner overstated his 
or her revenue? (3) In how many rounds do you think an average participant in this session 
overstated his or her revenue? (4) Across all rounds, by how much do you think an average 
participant overstated his or her revenue? 
 I label the two factors Partner Norm and Other Norm. I then perform two ANOVAs 
using these two factors as the dependent variables. Control centralization and compensation 
interdependence are the independent variables. Tables 12 and 13 provide the results from these 
ANOVAs and Figures 15 and 16 provide a graphical representation of the means. 
I find that compensation interdependence has a direct effect on Partner Norm (p = 0.07, 
two-tailed). This suggests that as compensation interdependence increases, participants perceive 
that their partner engages in more dishonest reporting. I also find that the interaction of 
compensation interdependence and control centralization is significant (p = 0.04, two-tailed). 
Specifically, when compensation interdependence is low, participants perceive that their partner 
is misreporting his or her performance less with a decentralized versus centralized control (p = 
0.03, two-tailed). However, when compensation interdependence is high, participants perceive 
their partner is reporting no differently with a decentralized versus centralized control (p = 0.38, 
two-tailed). This evidence suggests that the effectiveness of control centralization in changing an 
employee’s perceptions that relatively socially similar employees are misreporting is contingent 
upon compensation interdependence.29 
29 I label the participant’s partner as “relatively socially similar” because participants answered two post-experiment 
questions about how similar to their partner they perceived themselves to be and how similar to the other 
participants in the session they perceived themselves to be. Participants responded to these questions using a 7-point 
Likert Scale with higher values indicating a greater degree of similarity. The endpoints were Not at all Similar and 
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 Related to Other Norm, I find a significant main effect for control centralization (p = 
0.05, one-tailed) whereby participants perceived other participants to be less likely to misreport 
performance with a more decentralized control. However, the interaction effect and the main 
effect for compensation interdependence are both insignificant. This suggests that a different 
pattern is taking place as participants consider to what extent a relatively similar participant 
misreported versus a non-similar participant. 
 When comparing Figures 15 and 16, the high compensation interdependence line appears 
to be driving the difference in the results. More precisely, it appears that the Near Review / High 
CI condition is driving the results. The average perception that partners were misreporting was 
highest in that condition. However, that condition also had the third highest average perception 
that non-partner participants were misreporting. I explain this finding using social identity 
theory. 
 Social identity theory is the extent to which individuals identify with socially similar 
individuals (Hogg et al. 2004). Prior research has established that social identity increases as 
individuals share common outcomes (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Chen and Li 2009) and 
individuals within a group with high group identity more likely view outsiders as a threat to the 
group if they have the ability to prevent the group from achieving its objectives (Cikara, 
Botvinick, and Fiske 2011). Research suggests that this phenomenon, labeled the “us versus 
them” effect, is present from an early age and can lead to significant differences in behavior 
(Mahajan and Wynn 2012).  
Very Similar. There was no label on the midpoints. Participants perceived themselves to be more similar to their 
partner than a random other person in the session (4.87 versus 4.57, p = 0.04, two-tailed). 
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 The “us versus them” mentality could be playing out in my setting. Specifically, a 
participant could see their partner as part of an in-group association that is not present when 
considering non-partner participants within the session. Increases in compensation 
interdependence likely increase this perception by increasing social identity. As the threat of 
detection moves closer to the participants (through the decentralization of a control), the 
response to this threat could be to fight back by increasing misreporting. Participants will likely 
think that their partner also increases their misreporting in response to this threat (or wishfully 
think they did) and, therefore, perceive a higher norm that their partner is misreporting. Because 
no such social identity exists with non-partner participants, the interactive effect of control 
centralization and compensation interdependence does not occur when examining non-partner 
participants. Instead, the creation of descriptive norms against misreporting is primarily driven 
by the proximity of the control to the reporting individual through control centralization. 
Admittedly, this is speculation at this point. I discuss how future research involving experiments 
designed to test this theory could shed more light on these findings in Chapter 9.  
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CHAPTER 8: WITHIN SUBJECTS CONTROL CENTRALIZATION MANIPULATION  
 
8.1 Overview of Pilot Study - Within   
In addition to my initial pilot and full experiment, I also run a pilot experiment in which I 
manipulate control centralization within subjects. The purpose of this experiment is to examine 
whether a change in the centralization of a control triggers changes in employees’ behaviors. 
Additionally, I am interested in examining whether control centralization changes can lead to 
long-term changes in employee behavior. 
8.2 Design of Pilot Study – Within 
I design this pilot study similar to my full experiment. Participants make reporting 
decisions and receive compensation based on their reported performance. The participants are 
subject to the same review process whereby the facilitator draws a poker chip from a bowl and z-
Tree adjusts compensation to zero if the chip is red and he or she misreported. The only 
difference between this pilot and my full experiment is the control centralization manipulation. 
In this experiment, the control centralization manipulation was manipulated within-
subjects after the third round across sessions. I randomly assigned each session to one of two 
conditions: Near Review First or Far Review First. I read the same script and showed the same 
review demonstration to those participants in the Near Review First condition as I did to those 
participants in the Near Review condition in my full experiment. Similarly, I read the same script 
and showed the same review demonstration to participants in the Far Review First condition as I 
did to participants in the Far Review condition in my full experiment. After the third round 
reviews were complete but before participants made their fourth round reporting decision, I 
informed participants that the control would change for the last three rounds. I informed 
participants in the Near Review First condition that the poker chip selection for each participant 
would take place at the front of the room for the final three rounds. I told participants in the Far 
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Review First condition that the poker chip selection for each participant would take place at each 
participant’s desk for the final three rounds. I did not inform participants of the reason for the 
change.  
I also randomly assigned all participants within each session to either the High CI or Low 
CI condition. The compensation scheme used in this pilot experiment is identical to the 
compensation scheme used in my full experiment. 
8.3 Participants in the Pilot Study – Within 
Sixteen students from a large public university in the Midwest participated in the 
experiment. None of these participants participated in my first pilot study or in my full 
experiment. All students were sophomores, juniors, or seniors in the undergraduate accountancy 
program. The average age of all participants is 20.0 years old, and 56.3 percent of the 
participants are male.  
8.4 Results of Pilot Study – Within 
 Given the small size of the pilot study, I hesitate to make inferences from these results. 
Therefore, the reader should consider all results discussed in this section to be preliminary and 
should not make strong inferences until additional data collection occurs. 
8.4.1 Exclusion of Compensation Interdependence 
 I first examine the pattern of Dishonesty across participants before and after the within 
subjects manipulation. For this analysis, I do not yet separate out the effect of compensation 
interdependence on behavior. Specifically, I only examine the difference in Dishonesty across 
the within-subjects control centralization manipulation. Table 14 provides the results. 
 Participants in the Far Review First condition slightly increased their misreporting from 
the first three rounds to the last three rounds (0.75 vs. 0.79, p = 0.73, two-tailed). However, 
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participants in the Near Review First condition significantly increased their misreporting from 
the first three rounds to the last three rounds (0.74 vs. 0.89, p = 0.14, two-tailed). In other words, 
participants significantly increased their dishonest reporting when the facilitator changed from 
drawing poker chips at each participant’s desk in the first three rounds to drawing poker chips at 
the front of the room in the last three rounds. However, there was no significant change in 
dishonest reporting when the facilitator changed from selecting poker chips at the front of the 
room to selecting poker chips at each individual participant’s desk. 
 I next examine the pattern of results across all six rounds. Recall that the announcement 
took place after the third round review process but before the fourth round reporting decision. 
Because the reporting decision in the fourth round preceded the manipulated review, I can 
attribute any change in the fourth round to the communication of the change in the control. Since 
participants were not subject to the new control regime (resulting from the within manipulation) 
until after their fourth round reporting decisions were made any sustained change from the within 
subjects manipulation would be found in the fifth and sixth rounds. 
  Table 15 provides the mean and standard deviation of Dishonesty across rounds. Figure 
17 provides a graphical representation of average Dishonesty across rounds. The pattern of 
Dishonesty in Figure 17 provides evidence that the announcement of the control change had a 
significant effect on reporting behavior. After the facilitator announced the control would take 
place at the front of the room instead of at each participant’s desk, dishonesty increased (0.81 to 
0.93). However, after the facilitator announced the control would take place at each participant’s 
desk instead of at the front of the room, Dishonesty decreased (0.85 to 0.62). This evidence 
suggests that the communication of a control change to employees can have a significant effect 
on their reporting behavior. 
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 I also find that the change from a decentralized to a centralized control and from a 
centralized to decentralized control does not appear to create sustained behavior changes. In both 
Round 5 and Round 6, there are no significant differences between the Near Review First and 
Far Review First conditions. This suggests that employee behavior changes after the 
communication of a change in control centralization, but without additional interventions, the 
change does not appear to be permanent.  
8.4.2 Consideration of Compensation Interdependence 
  In the analysis of the pilot study data up to this point, I make no consideration for 
compensation interdependence. In this subsection, I analyze the data and discuss whether 
compensation interdependence changes the results.  
 Recall that I randomly assigned participants to compensation interdependence conditions 
within each session. Because I randomly assigned participants, there was not a uniform 
distribution of participants in the High CI and Low CI conditions. There were two participants in 
the Low CI / Near Review First condition and six participants in the High CI / Near Review First 
condition. There were four participants in both the Low CI / Far Review First and High CI / Near 
Review First conditions. To tease out the effect of compensation interdependence, I compare 
participants’ average dishonesty across the Far Review First and Near Review First conditions 
conditional upon participants being in either the Low CI or High CI conditions. I remind the 
reader that this reduces my already small sample to even smaller subsamples. Table 16 provides 
the results from this analysis, and Figure 18 provides a graphical representation of average 
dishonesty across rounds. 
 I first compare dishonest reporting for those participants in the High CI condition. I find 
an upward spike in misreporting in the fourth round when the facilitator moved the review to the 
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front of the room from each participant’s desk. However, there was no change in reporting 
behavior when the facilitator moved the control from the front of the room to the participant’s 
desk. I also find that participants in the Near Review First condition had higher average 
dishonesty in all rounds than participants in the Far Review First condition.  
 I then compare dishonest reporting for those participants in the Low CI condition. I find a 
downward spike in misreporting in the fourth round when the facilitator moved the review from 
the front of the room to each participant’s desk. There was also a small dip in misreporting when 
the facilitator moved the review to the front of the room from each participant’s desk. Therefore, 
it would appear that both control changes reduced misreporting when compensation 
interdependence was low, but the change from a centralized to decentralized control resulted in a 
greater decrease in dishonest reporting. 
 This evidence suggests that compensation interdependence could moderate the 
effectiveness of a change in control centralization. Again, I performed these analyses with 
limited observations. Before the reader makes inferences from these results, I should collect 
additional data to ensure the results are consistent. However, this evidence does suggest that 
future research examining how compensation schemes moderate the effectiveness of a control 
change could be fruitful.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines and finds evidence that compensation interdependence moderates 
the effect that control centralization has on misreporting. Specifically, when compensation 
interdependence is low, employees misreport less with a decentralized control than a centralized 
control. However, with high compensation interdependence, the difference in performance 
misreporting between centralized and decentralized controls decreases. Examination of post-
experiment questions suggests that subjective detection likelihood increases as a control becomes 
more decentralized, independent of compensation interdependence. However, the difference in 
reporting behavior resulting from greater perceived detection likelihood decreases with greater 
compensation interdependence. 
Additional analyses reveal that control centralization can change the perception that other 
employees are misreporting (i.e., the descriptive norm of misreporting). As employees perceive a 
stronger descriptive norm for misreporting, they increase their own dishonest reporting. 
However, compensation interdependence moderates the effect that control centralization has on 
the perception of a misreporting norm. Specifically, as compensation interdependence increases, 
employees are less likely to perceive that control centralization influences the descriptive norm 
of misreporting. This evidence suggests that compensation interdependence not only has the 
previously documented direct effect on dishonest reporting, but also an indirect effect by 
moderating how effective control centralization is at influencing reporting behavior. 
This study contributes to control literature by examining a new construct, control 
centralization, and providing evidence that it can have a significant effect on employees’ 
perceptions of control effectiveness. While this study focuses on one outcome of control 
centralization, misreporting, future research could examine both the determinants of control 
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centralization and other outcomes of control centralization. Future research can use the control 
centralization framework described in this study as a springboard for future exploration of the 
control centralization construct. 
This study also contributes to the control literature by offering theory and evidence of the 
interaction among controls and their joint influence on reporting behavior. While prior literature 
identifies the direct effect that compensation interdependence has on misreporting, my study 
contributes by highlighting a moderating effect. This moderating effect is important because it 
suggests that compensation interdependence can mute the effectiveness of controls designed in 
part to reduce misreporting. In addition to documenting this moderating effect, this study also 
provides evidence of the cognitive process through which this effect occurs. Specifically, this 
study provides a glimpse into how perceptions about a control itself and perceptions about how 
others respond to a control underlie the moderating effect. Practitioners, including control system 
and compensation system designers, can leverage this study when implementing controls. 
 Limitations to this study provide opportunities for future research. Similar to other 
studies examining dishonesty in a lab setting, the penalty for misreporting is significantly lower 
than an individual would face in the natural setting. Moreover, detection likelihood was set 
intentionally low to induce sufficient dishonest reporting, the construct of interest. Future 
research could consider how stronger penalties for dishonest reporting and a higher probability 
of detection could influence performance misreporting. 
 This study also makes several design choices to cleanly test the theory outlined in this 
paper. For example, this study does not examine how negative compensation interdependence 
and control centralization jointly influence misreporting. Additionally, this study does not 
examine reviews contingent upon reported performance. If researchers were able to develop 
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theoretical reasons why these design choices would change the pattern of results presented in this 
study, it would certainly warrant future research. 
The theory underlying my first hypothesis is that increasing the psychological distance 
between a control and a reporting individual decreases their perception that the control will 
detect misreporting. At a conceptual level, this would suggest that as control centralization 
increases, it decreases the perceived effectiveness of the control. I operationalize control 
centralization by manipulating the location where the control occurs. Given that control 
centralization is multi-faceted, one could question whether my chosen operationalization 
generalizes to the other dimensions of control centralization. 
 As previously discussed, as a control becomes more centralized there is likely to be 
greater social distance between the individual performing the control and the reporting manager. 
It is unclear how social distance influences the perceived effectiveness of the control. On one 
hand, low social distance could foster trust between the two parties, which could cause the 
reporting manager to believe the individual performing the control will be less ardent about the 
control. This could decrease the perceived effectiveness of the control. On the other hand, a high 
level of trust fostered by low social distance could lead the reporting manger to take actions to 
minimize the likelihood of having that trust broken. Knowing that a control is in place to detect 
misreporting, the reporting manager could be more honest in their reporting to prevent damaging 
the mutual trust. Because the control serves as a mechanism that could destroy trust, it becomes 
more effective in that the reporting manager will be more honest to preserve the trust. Therefore, 
it is unclear whether the location operationalization of control centralization generalizes to the 
social component of control centralization. This is an open empirical question. 
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 It is also unclear how the use of a standardized versus idiosyncratic control affects 
perceived control effectiveness. On one hand, a centralized control will likely decrease the 
variance of the quality of the control within the firm. Because the firm implements and performs 
the same control across all business units, it is unlikely that differences across business unit 
controllers’ personality, training, time, or resources will drive differences in control quality. This 
could increase the perceived effectiveness of the control. On the other hand, each business unit’s 
controller could utilize their knowledge about the local operating environment when designing 
and performing a decentralized control. If the business unit controller has specific knowledge 
about how an employee could misreport within their business unit, then this information will 
potentially be lost with a centralized control. This could decrease the perceived effectiveness of 
the control. Therefore, whether a standardized control increases or decreases perceived control 
effectiveness is also an open empirical question.  
 Given the discussion in the last two paragraphs, there are some limitations to the extent to 
which my operationalization of control centralization generalizes to other operationalization. 
However, my chosen operationalization, the location where control work occurs, represents an 
exogenous choice variable that firms can change to influence employee reporting behavior. As 
such, despite this limitation in generalizability, this dissertation makes a significant contribution 
to the understanding of how control centralization influences reporting behavior. 
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Appendix 1: Excerpt from D.R. Horton, Inc. 2014 10-K 
 
Decentralized Homebuilding Operations 
 
We view homebuilding as a local business; therefore, most of our direct homebuilding activities are 
decentralized, which provides flexibility to our local managers on operational decisions. At September 30, 2014, we 
had 37 separate homebuilding operating divisions, many of which operate in more than one market area. Generally, 
each operating division consists of a division president; a controller; land entitlement, acquisition and development 
personnel; a sales manager and sales and marketing personnel; a construction manager and construction 
superintendents; customer service personnel; a purchasing manager and office staff. We believe that our division 
presidents and their management teams, who are familiar with local conditions, generally have the best information 
on which to base many decisions regarding their operations. Our division presidents receive performance based 
compensation if they achieve targeted financial and operating metrics related to their operating divisions. Following 
is a summary of our homebuilding activities that are decentralized in our local operating divisions, and the control 
and oversight functions that are centralized in our regional and corporate offices: 
 
 
Operating Division Responsibilities 
 
Each operating division is responsible for: 
 
• Site selection, which involves 
— A feasibility study; 
— Soil and environmental reviews; 
— Review of existing zoning and other governmental requirements; 
— Review of the need for and extent of offsite work required to obtain project entitlements; and 
— Financial analysis of the potential project; 
 
• Negotiating lot option, land acquisition and related contracts; 
• Obtaining all necessary land development and home construction approvals; 
• Selecting land development subcontractors and ensuring their work meets our contracted scopes; 
• Selecting building plans and architectural schemes; 
• Selecting construction subcontractors and ensuring their work meets our contracted scopes; 
• Planning and managing homebuilding schedules; 
• Developing and implementing local marketing and sales plans; 
• Determining the pricing for each house plan in a given community; and 
• Coordinating post-closing customer service and warranty repairs. 
 
Centralized Controls 
 
We centralize many important risk elements of our homebuilding business through our regional and corporate 
offices. We have five separate homebuilding regional offices. Generally, each regional office consists of a region 
president, legal counsel, a chief financial officer and limited office support staff. Each of our region presidents and 
their management teams are responsible for oversight of the operations of a number of homebuilding operating 
divisions, including: 
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• Review and approval of division business plans and budgets; 
• Review of all land and lot acquisition contracts; 
• Review of all business and financial analysis for potential land and lot inventory investments; 
• Oversight of land and home inventory levels; 
• Monitoring division financial and operating performance; and 
• Review of major personnel decisions and division incentive compensation plans. 
 
 
 
Our corporate executives and corporate office departments are responsible for establishing our operational 
policies and internal control standards and for monitoring compliance with established policies and controls 
throughout our operations. The corporate office also has primary responsibility for direct management of certain key 
risk elements and initiatives through the following centralized functions: 
 
• Financing; 
• Cash management; 
• Allocation of capital; 
• Issuance and monitoring of inventory investment guidelines to our operating divisions; 
• Approval and funding of land and lot acquisitions; 
• Monitoring and analysis of margins, costs, profitability and inventory levels; 
• Risk and litigation management; 
• Environmental assessments of land and lot acquisitions; 
• Information technology systems; 
• Accounting and management reporting; 
• Income taxes; 
• Internal audit; 
• Public reporting and investor and media relations; 
• Administration of payroll and employee benefits; 
• Negotiation of national purchasing contracts; 
• Administration of customer satisfaction surveys and reporting of results; and 
• Approval of major personnel decisions and management incentive compensation plans. 
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Appendix 2: Experimental Materials 
 
Ground Rules – All Conditions 
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General Overview – All Conditions 
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Session Overview – All Conditions 
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Session Overview Quiz – All Conditions 
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Answers to Session Overview Quiz – All Conditions 
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Partner Chat – All Conditions 
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Reporting Decision Description – All Conditions 
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Reporting Decision Quiz – All Conditions 
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Reporting Decision Quiz Answers – All Conditions 
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Compensation Description – CI Low Conditions 
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Compensation Description Quiz – CI Low Conditions 
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Compensation Description Quiz Answers – CI Low Conditions 
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Compensation Description – CI High Conditions 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
Compensation Description Quiz – CI High Conditions 
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Compensation Description Quiz Answers – CI High Conditions 
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Review Description – All Conditions 
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Review Description Quiz – All Conditions 
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Review Description Quiz Answers – All Conditions 
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Compensation Example Introduction – All Conditions 
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Compensation Example Part 1 – CI Low Conditions 
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Compensation Example Part 1 – CI High Conditions 
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Compensation Example Part 2 – All Conditions 
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Review Demonstration Screen – All Conditions 
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Review Demonstration Script – Far Review Condition 
I will now walk through a demonstration of the review process. Recall that the review will take 
place at the end of each round after everyone has made their reporting decision.  
At the end of each round, for every participant in the room, I will draw a poker chip from this 
bowl where there are a large number of white chips and a small number of red chips. [WALK & 
CHURN] 
If your chip is white, then you have not been selected for a review for that round. However, if 
your chip is red, then you have been selected for a review. I will then put that chip back in the 
bowl before I draw a poker chip for the next person. I will place the bowl inside of this bag so I 
cannot see what poker chip I am drawing.  
Every individual will have a poker chip selected for him or her each round. I will stand at the 
front of the room and acknowledge the individual for whom the poker chip is being drawn. For 
example, if I were doing the process for this individual [point to someone], I would acknowledge 
that the chip selection was taking place for [him/her], reach into the bag, and draw a poker chip 
at random to determine if a review takes place for that individual. I will then hold the chip up and 
announce to the class the color of the poker chip. 
During this process, you will have two buttons on your screen. One indicates you have not been 
selected for a review and one indicates you have been selected for a review. Please click the 
appropriate button based on the color of the poker chip that is drawn for you. Again, white 
means you are not selected for a review and red means you are selected for a review. If you are 
not selected for a review, you will advance to the next screen. If you are selected for a review, 
your computer will send my computer a message that informs me of your Actual Revenue and 
your Reported Revenue, which I will write down on this pad of paper. You will then be able to 
advance to the next screen. 
Please click okay on your screen to start a practice round. 
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Review Demonstration Script – Near Review Condition 
I will now walk through a demonstration of the review process. Recall that the review will take place at 
the end of each round after everyone has made their reporting decision.  
At the end of each round, for every participant in the room, I will draw a poker chip from this bowl where 
there are a large number of white chips and a small number of red chips. [WALK & CHURN] 
If your chip is white, then you have not been selected for a review for that round. However, if your chip is 
red, then you have been selected for a review. I will then put that chip back in the bowl before I draw a 
poker chip for the next person. I will place the bowl inside of this bag so I cannot see what poker chip I 
am drawing.  
Every individual will have a poker chip selected for him or her each round. I will walk around to each 
individual’s desk to acknowledge the individual for whom the poker chip is being drawn. For example, if 
I were doing the process for this individual [point to someone], I would acknowledge that the chip 
selection was taking place for [him/her] by walking over to [his/her] desk, reach into the bag, and draw a 
poker chip at random to determine if a review takes place for that individual. I will then hold the chip up 
and announce to the class the color of the poker chip. 
During this process, you will have two buttons on your screen. One indicates you have not been selected 
for a review and one indicates you have been selected for a review. Please click the appropriate button 
based on the color of the poker chip that is drawn for you. Again, white means you are not selected for a 
review and red means you are selected for a review. If you are not selected for a review, you will 
advance to the next screen. If you are selected for a review, your computer will display a message that 
informs me of your Actual Revenue and your Reported Revenue, which I will write down on this pad of 
paper. You will then be able to advance to the next screen. 
Please click okay on your screen to start the practice round. 
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Practice Round Transition – All Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 1 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 2 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 3 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 4 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 5 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 6 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 7 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 8 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 9 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 10 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 11 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 12 – Low CI Conditions 
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Practice Round Instructions 12 – High CI Conditions 
 
The only difference between High CI and Low CI conditions for all practice screens are the instructions at the top of the screen and 
the column headings. For brevity, I only show practice round instruction 12 screen for the High CI condition. However, participants in 
all conditions saw all 12 screens. 
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Reporting Information 1 – Low CI Condition 
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Reporting Information 2 – Low CI Condition 
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Reporting Information 2 – High CI Condition 
 
Participants in the High CI condition also saw the Reporting Information 1 Screen. For brevity, it is omitted. 
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Review Process 1 – All Conditions 
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 Practice Round Transition – All Conditions 
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Reporting Screen - Low CI Condition 
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Reporting Screen - High CI Condition 
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Reporting Information Screen – Low CI Conditions 
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Reporting Information Screen – High CI Conditions 
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Review Screen – All Conditions 
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Review Screen – White Poker Chip - All Conditions 
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Review Screen – Red Poker Chip – Far Review 
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Review Screen – Red Poker Chip – Near Review 
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Round Selection Process Screen – All Conditions 
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Transition to Post Experiment Question – All Conditions 
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Post Experiment Question 1 – All Conditions 
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 Post Experiment Question 2 – All Conditions 
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 Post Experiment Question 3 – All Conditions 
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 Post Experiment Question 4 – All Conditions 
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 Post Experiment Question 5 – All Conditions 
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 Post Experiment Question 6 – All Conditions 
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 Post Experiment Question 7 – All Conditions 
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 Post Experiment Question 7 – All Conditions 
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 Post Experiment Question 8 – All Conditions 
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 Post Experiment Question 9 – All Conditions 
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 Post Experiment Question 10 – All Conditions 
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 Payment Screen – All Conditions 
 
This payment screen was created for illustration purposes with only two computers running on the computer program. Therefore, the 
cash payment on this screen is much higher than it was for participants because the bonus pool is divided between only two players. 
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Figures 
 
FIGURE 1 
Control Centralization Framework 
 
 
 
This figure provides a pictorial representation of the control centralization framework. The vertical line with the 
“centralized” and “decentralized” endpoints in the middle represents the centralized/decentralized continuum along 
which one can classify a control. The placement of a control along that continuum is contingent upon the states of 
the control centralization components. As one classifies more components of a control as centralized (decentralized), 
based on its state, the control classification moves further up (down) along the control centralization continuum. 
  
1) Location of 
control work
2) Location in 
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3) Social distance 
between parties
4) Control 
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5) Single/multiple 
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system(s)
Control 
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FIGURE 2 
Theoretic Framework and Hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure provides a graphical representation of the causal links underlying the predicted effects. H1 predicts 
greater control centralization decreases employees’ subjective assessments of detection likelihood. H2 predicts the 
difference in the extent of performance misreporting between a centralized and decentralized control is greater when 
compensation interdependence is low than when compensation interdependence is high. Prior studies (Church et al. 
2012; Maas & Van Rinsum 2013) show greater compensation interdependence increases performance misreporting. 
Control 
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FIGURE 3 
Predicted Effect of Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence on Dishonest 
Reporting 
 
 
 
 
This figure provides a graphical representation of the predicted joint effect of compensation interdependence and 
control centralization on misreporting. Prior research predicts that the average of C and D will be greater than the 
average of A and B (i.e., the direct effect of compensation interdependence on misreporting). Hypothesis 2 predicts 
that the difference between B and A will be greater than the difference between D and C (i.e., the indirect effect of 
compensation interdependence on misreporting). I have no theoretical basis to predict whether D is greater than or 
no different than C. Therefore, the range of lines between C and D represents the uncertainty about the slope. 
Near Review Far Review
High CI
Low CI
Compensation 
Interdependence 
D
is
ho
ne
st
y 
A 
B 
D 
C 
Control Centralization 
165 
 
FIGURE 4 
Timeline of Experiment 
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Facilitator 
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review process. 
Participants make 
practice reporting 
decision and practice 
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see partner’s reported 
revenue, and reviews 
are performed. 
Participants told 
which three rounds 
are selected, answer 
post-experiment 
questions, find out 
how much they 
earned, collect their 
money, and leave. 
Repeated for six rounds 
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FIGURE 5 
Pilot Experiment: Average Dishonesty across Conditions  
 
  
Near Review     Far Review 
 
This figure provides a graphical representation of the effects of compensation interdependence and control 
centralization on dishonest reporting. Average Dishonesty for each condition is provided. Dishonesty is calculated 
as Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue).  
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FIGURE 6 
Pilot Experiment: Mediation Analysis using Perceived Detection Likelihood 
 
Panel A: High CI subsample (n = 27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Low CI subsample (n = 27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows the results of two Baron and Kenny (1986) regression mediation analyses. Panel A provides the 
results for a mediation analysis for the High CI subsample. Panel B provides the results for the Low CI subsample. 
All p-values are two-tailed. Control Centralization is an indicator variable coded one if a participant was in the Far 
Review condition, zero for the Near Review condition. Dishonesty is calculated for each round as (Reported 
Revenue – Actual Revenue) / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue) and is averaged across the six rounds. Detection 
Likelihood is participants’ respond to the post-experiment question: Suppose you were to do the same task with the 
same review process for six more rounds. What would you assess the likelihood to be that you would be selected for 
a review at least once in the six rounds? Participants could respond with any value between 0 and 100, inclusive. 
Age is included in all regressions as a covariate. 
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FIGURE 7 
Pilot Experiment: Mediation Analysis using Perceived Detection Likelihood and Social Norms 
 
Panel A: High CI subsample (n = 27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Low CI subsample (n = 27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows the results of two Baron and Kenny regression mediation analyses. Panel A provides the results 
for a mediation analysis for the High CI subsample. Panel B provides the results for the Low CI subsample. All p-
values are two-tailed. Control Centralization is an indicator variable coded one if a participant was in the Far Review 
condition, zero for the Near Review condition. Dishonesty is calculated for each round as (Reported Revenue – 
Actual Revenue) / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue) and is averaged across the six rounds. Detection Likelihood is 
participants’ responses to the post-experiment question: Suppose you were to do the same task with the same review 
process for six more rounds. What would you assess the likelihood to be that you would be selected for a review at 
least once in the six rounds? Participants could respond with any value between 0 and 100, inclusive. Prevent Others 
is participants’ responses to the post-experiment question: How effective do you think the review was in preventing 
participants from overstating revenue? Higher values indicate a higher level of effectiveness.  
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FIGURE 8 
Full Experiment: Effect of Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence on 
Dishonest Reporting  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure provides a graphical representation of the effects of compensation interdependence and control 
centralization on dishonest reporting. Average Dishonesty for each condition is provided. Dishonesty is calculated 
as Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue).  
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FIGURE 9 
Full Experiment: Mediation Analysis – Perceived Detection Likelihood 
 
Panel A: High CI subsample (n = 42) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Low CI subsample (n = 44) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows the results of two Baron and Kenny regression mediation analyses. Panel A provides the results 
for a mediation analysis for the High CI subsample. Panel B provides the results for the Low CI subsample. All p-
values are two-tailed. Control Centralization is an indicator variable coded one if a participant was in the Far Review 
condition, zero for the Near Review condition. Dishonesty is calculated for each round as (Reported Revenue – 
Actual Revenue) / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue) and is averaged across the six rounds. Detection Likelihood is 
participants’ response to the post-experiment question: Suppose you were to do the same task with the same review 
process for six more rounds. What would you assess the likelihood to be that you would be selected for a review at 
least once in the six rounds? Participants could respond with any value between 0 and 100, inclusive. A Sobel-
Goodman test reveals that Detection Likelihood mediates 17 percent of the total effect between Control 
Centralization and Average Dishonest in the Low CI subsample. 
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FIGURE 10 
Full Experiment: Mediation Analysis – Misreporting Norm 
 
Panel A: High CI subsample (n = 42) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Low CI subsample (n = 42) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows the results of two Baron and Kenny regression mediation analyses. Panel A provides the results 
for a mediation analysis for the High CI subsample. Panel B provides the results for the Low CI subsample. All p-
values are two-tailed. Control Centralization is an indicator variable coded one if a participant was in the Far Review 
condition, zero for the Near Review condition. Dishonesty is calculated for each round as (Reported Revenue – 
Actual Revenue) / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue) and is averaged across the six rounds. Misreporting Norm is 
calculated using a principal component analysis on the responses to four post-experiment question: (1) In how many 
rounds do you think your partner overstated his or her revenue? (2) Across all rounds, by how much do you think 
your partner overstated his or her revenue? (3) In how many rounds do you think an average participant in this 
session overstated his or her revenue? (4) Across all rounds, by how much do you think an average participant 
overstated his or her revenue? Participants responded using a seven point Likert Scale with higher values indicating 
a higher perception that others were misreporting. A Sobel-Goodman test reveals that Misreporting Norm mediates 
66 percent of the total effect between Control Centralization and Average Dishonesty in the Low CI subsample. 
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FIGURE 11 
Full Experiment: Distribution of Actual Revenue across Conditions 
 
 Near Review/ Low CI Near Review / High CI 
    
 Far Review / Low CI Far Review / High CI 
  
 
 
The bar charts show the frequency of actual revenue across experimental conditions. The x-axis corresponds to 
different “bins” of actual revenue where each bin represents $0.50 increments of actual revenue. For example, bin 1 
contains all observations with actual revenue between $2.00 and $2.49, bin 2 contains all observations with actual 
revenue between $2.50 and $2.99 and so on. The red line indicates the number of observations in each bin given a 
uniform actual revenue distribution across bins. 
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FIGURE 12 
Full Experiment: Dishonesty across Rounds 
 
Round 1     Round 2 
  
 
Round 3     Round 4 
 
 
Round 5     Round 6 
 
 
This figure shows the patter of dishonesty across the six rounds of the experiment. Dishonesty is calculated as 
Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue). The solid blue line is the High CI 
condition and the dotted red line is the Low CI condition.
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 FIGURE 13 
Full Experiment: Moderated Mediation Model and Bootstrapping using Detection Likelihood 
 
Panel A: Moderated Mediation Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Bootstrapped Conditional Indirect Effects (CIE) 
 
Value of Moderator Coefficient - CIE Bootstrap Std. Err. Z-Value P > |z| 
Mean CI – 1 Std. Deviation 0.03 0.02 1.11 0.27 
Mean CI 0.01 0.02 0.85 0.40 
Mean CI + 1 Std. Deviation -0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.98 
 
This figure contains the results of a moderated mediation analysis. Panel A provides the significance of the different 
links in the model. Panel B provides the significance of the indirect effects as the value of the moderator increases. 
All p-values are two-tailed. Control Centralization is an indicator variable coded one if a participant was in the Far 
Review condition, zero for the Near Review condition. Dishonesty is calculated for each round as (Reported 
Revenue – Actual Revenue) / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue) and is averaged across the six rounds. Detection 
Likelihood is participants’ response to the post-experiment question: Suppose you were to do the same task with the 
same review process for six more rounds. What would you assess the likelihood to be that you would be selected for 
a review at least once in the six rounds? Participants could respond with any value between 0 and 100, inclusive. 
Compensation Interdependence is an indicator variable coded 1 for the High CI condition, zero for the Low CI 
condition. Panel B reveals that as the value of the moderator increases (as compensation becomes more 
interdependent), the mediation of the indirect effect by Detection Likelihood decreases. The bootstrapped 
conditional effects were generated using 1,000 replications. 
  
Control Centralization 
1 = Far Review 
0 = Near Review 
Detection 
Likelihood 
 
Prediction: (-) 
Coef:   -9.94 
P-value:   0.05 Prediction: (-) 
Coef:     -0.01 
P-value:  0.09 With Mediator 
Coef:   0.03 
P-value:  0.63 Average 
Dishonesty 
Comp. Interdependence 
1 = High CI 
0 = Low CI 
Prediction: (+) 
Coef:     0.00 
P-value:  0.21 
Prediction: (+) 
Coef:     0.08 
P-value:  0.34 
175 
 
FIGURE 14 
Full Experiment: Moderated Mediation Model and Bootstrapping using Misreporting Norm 
 
Panel A: Moderated Mediation Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Link Prediction Coefficient P-Value  Link Prediction Coefficient P-Value 
A + 1.05 0.03  D + 0.06 0.36 
B + 1.03 0.04  E + 0.07 < 0.01 
C - -0.95 0.15  F + 0.21 < 0.01 
     G - -0.13 0.18 
 
Panel B: Bootstrapped Conditional Indirect Effects (CIE) 
 
Value of Moderator Coefficient - CIE Bootstrap Std. Err. Z-Value P > |z| 
Mean CI – 1 Std. Deviation 0.07 0.04 1.78 0.08 
Mean CI 0.04 0.03 1.51 0.13 
Mean CI + 1 Std. Deviation 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.82 
 
This figure contains the results of a moderated mediation analysis. Panel A provides the significance of the different links in the 
model. Panel B provides the significance of the indirect effects as the value of the moderator increases. All p-values are two-
tailed. Control Centralization is an indicator variable coded one if a participant was in the Far Review condition, zero for the 
Near Review condition. Dishonesty is calculated for each round as (Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue) / (Max Revenue – 
Actual Revenue) and is averaged across the six rounds. Misreporting Norm is calculated using a principal component analysis on 
the responses to four post-experiment question: (1) In how many rounds do you think your partner overstated his or her revenue? 
(2) Across all rounds, by how much do you think your partner overstated his or her revenue? (3) In how many rounds do you 
think an average participant in this session overstated his or her revenue? (4) Across all rounds, by how much do you think an 
average participant overstated his or her revenue? Participants responded using a seven point Likert Scale with higher values 
indicating a higher perception that others were misreporting. Compensation Interdependence is an indicator variable coded 1 for 
the High CI condition, zero for the Low CI condition. Panel B reveals that as the value of the moderator increases (as 
compensation becomes more interdependent), the mediation of the indirect effect by Misreporting Norm decreases. The 
bootstrapped conditional effects were generated using 1,000 replications.
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FIGURE 15 
Effect of Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence on Dishonest Reporting on 
Partner’s Misreporting Norm 
 
 
 
This figure provides a graphical representation of the effects of compensation interdependence and control 
centralization on the perceived norm that a participant’s partner was misreporting. Partner’s Misreporting Norm is 
calculated using a principal component analysis on the responses to two post-experiment question: (1) In how many 
rounds do you think your partner overstated his or her revenue? (2) Across all rounds, by how much do you think 
your partner overstated his or her revenue? Higher scores indicate a higher perception that a participant’s partner 
overstated his or her revenue.  
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FIGURE 16 
Effect of Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence on Dishonest Reporting on 
Other Participant’s Misreporting Norm 
 
 
 
 
This figure provides a graphical representation of the effects of compensation interdependence and control 
centralization on the perceived norm that other participants in the session were misreporting. Other’s Reporting 
Norm is calculated using a principal component analysis on the responses to two post-experiment question: (1) In 
how many rounds do you think an average participant in this session overstated his or her revenue? (2) Across all 
rounds, by how much do you think an average participant overstated his or her revenue? Higher scores indicate a 
higher perception that an average participant overstated his or her revenue. The instructions specifically indicated 
that “an average participant” does not include their partner.  
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FIGURE 17 
Pilot Experiment #2: Dishonesty across Rounds for Within-Subjects Manipulation 
 
 
 
This figure provides a graphical representation of how average dishonest reporting changed across rounds. After the 
third round, the control centralization within-subjects manipulation was announced. Dishonesty is calculated as 
Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue).  
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FIGURE 18 
Pilot Experiment #2: Dishonesty across Rounds for Within-Subjects Manipulation Contingent on 
Compensation Interdependence 
 
Panel A: High Compensation 
 
 
 
Panel B: Low Compensation 
 
 
 
This figure provides a graphical representation of how average dishonest reporting changed across rounds. After the 
third round, the control centralization within-subjects manipulation was announced. Dishonesty is calculated as 
Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue).  
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Tables 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics by Condition – Pilot Experiment 
 Control Centralization   
 Near Review  Far Review  TOTAL 
Low CI n = 54  n = 108  n = 162 
 Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
Actual Revenue 3.89 1.08 2.01 5.86  3.96 1.13 2.11 5.99  3.94 1.11 2.01 5.99 
Reported Revenue 5.70 0.51 4.25 6.00  5.81 0.55 2.31 6.00  5.78 0.54 2.31 6.00 
Overstate 1.81 1.32 0.00 3.94  1.85 1.21 0.00 3.89  1.84 1.24 0.00 3.94 
Dishonesty 0.69 0.45 0.00 1.00  0.83 0.36 0.00 1.00  0.78 0.39 0.00 1.00 
               
High CI n = 90  n = 72  n = 162 
 Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
Actual Revenue 4.17 1.12 2.04 5.94  4.01 1.18 2.01 5.94  4.10 1.15 2.01 5.94 
Reported Revenue 5.71 0.66 2.63 6.00  5.91 0.20 5.05 6.00  5.80 0.52 2.63 6.00 
Overstate 1.54 1.20 0.00 3.89  1.90 1.27 0.00 3.99  1.70 1.24 0.00 3.99 
Dishonesty 0.79 0.39 0.00 1.00  0.85 0.35 0.00 1.00  0.82 0.37 0.00 1.00 
               
TOTAL n = 144  n = 180  n = 324 
 Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
Actual Revenue 4.07 1.11 2.01 5.94  3.98 1.15 2.01 5.99  4.02 1.13 2.01 5.99 
Reported Revenue 5.71 0.60 2.63 6.00  5.85 0.45 2.31 6.00  5.79 0.53 2.31 6.00 
Overstate 1.64 1.25 0.00 3.94  1.87 1.23 0.00 3.99  1.77 1.24 0.00 3.99 
Dishonesty 0.75 0.42 0.00 1.00  0.84 0.35 0.00 1.00  0.80 0.38 0.00 1.00 
               
This table provides summary statistics for each experimental treatment condition. The experiment had two manipulated factors: control centralization (Near 
Review/Far Review) and the level of compensation interdependence (High CI / Low CI). Actual Revenue refers to the actual revenue generated from a project that 
was uniformly distributed between 2 and 6 and was randomly selected each round. Reported Revenue is the amount the participant elected to report the project 
generated each round. It was bounded between the Actual Revenue and 6. Overstate is Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue. Dishonesty is Overstate / (6 – Actual 
Revenue) and captures the extent to which a participant misreported given the amount they were able to misreport. 
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TABLE 2 
Generalized Least-Squares Estimation of Dishonesty – Pilot 
                 
Variables   Model 1   Model 2 
Intercept  2.50 *** (0.54)  2.76 *** (0.53) 
Far Review  0.14 * (0.09)  0.15 ** (0.09) 
Far Review * High CI (H2)  -0.19 * (0.13)  -0.20 * (0.13) 
High CI  0.17 ** (0.10)  0.20 ** (0.09) 
Age  -0.09 *** (0.03)  -0.07 *** (0.03) 
Actual Revenue      -0.15 *** (0.01) 
Wald chi-square statistic   14.86 ***     105.34 ***   
 *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively (hypothesized relations one-tailed, all others two-tailed) 
 
This table provides the results of an OLS regression with Dishonesty as the dependent variables and indicator 
variables for each condition as the independent variables. Age is also included as a covariate. All models were 
estimated assuming panel-specific heteroskedastic errors. Standard errors of the coefficients are reported in 
parentheses. Dishonesty is calculated as Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue). 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics by Condition Aggregated Across all Rounds 
 
 Control Centralization   
 Near Review  Far Review  TOTAL 
High CI n = 108  n = 156  n = 264 
 Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
Actual revenue 4.17 1.11 2.02 5.98  4.06 1.23 2.01 6.00  4.10 1.18 2.01 6.00 
Reported revenue 5.36 0.81 2.27 6.00  5.61 0.61 2.71 6.00  5.51 0.71 2.27 6.00 
Overstate 1.19 1.33 0.00 3.98  1.55 1.39 0.00 3.99  1.40 1.38 0.00 3.99 
Dishonesty 0.48 0.48 0.00 1.00  0.61 0.46 0.00 1.00  0.56 0.47 0.00 1.00 
               
Low CI n = 108  n = 144  n = 252 
 Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
Actual revenue 3.96 1.17 2.00 5.96  3.81 1.13 2.01 5.96  3.87 1.14 2.00 5.96 
Reported revenue 5.72 0.56 3.45 6.00  5.47 0.85 2.36 6.00  5.58 0.75 2.36 6.00 
Overstate 1.77 1.29 0.00 3.97  1.66 1.32 0.00 3.99  1.71 1.31 0.00 3.99 
Dishonesty 0.76 0.40 0.00 1.00  0.70 0.43 0.00 1.00  0.72 0.42 0.00 1.00 
               
TOTAL n = 216  n = 300  n = 516 
 Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
Actual revenue 4.06 1.14 2.00 5.98  3.94 1.18 2.01 5.99  3.99 1.17 2.00 6.00 
Reported revenue 5.54 0.72 2.27 6.00  5.54 0.74 2.36 6.00  5.54 0.73 2.27 6.00 
Overstate 1.48 1.34 0.00 3.98  1.61 1.36 0.00 3.99  1.55 1.35 0.00 3.99 
Dishonesty 0.62 0.46 0.00 1.00  0.65 0.45 0.00 1.00  0.64 0.45 0.00 1.00 
               
This table provides summary statistics for each experiment condition. The experiment had two manipulated factors: control centralization (Near Review/Far 
Review) and compensation interdependence (High CI / Low CI). Actual revenue refers to the actual revenue from a project that was uniformly distributed 
between two and six and randomly generated each round. Reported revenue is the amount the participant elected to report the project generated each round. It 
was bounded between actual revenue and six. Overstate is Reported revenue – Actual revenue. Dishonesty is Overstate / (6 – Actual revenue). It captures the 
extent to which a participant dishonestly reported, given the amount they were able to misreport. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics by Condition and Round 
 
 
Near Review / Low CI 
(n=18) 
 Far Review / Low CI 
(n=26) 
 Near Review / High CI 
(n=18) 
 Far Review / High CI 
(n=24) 
 Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
Round 1                    
Actual revenue 4.03 1.03 2.69 5.96  3.99 1.36 2.11 5.93  3.61 0.97 2.03 5.10  4.27 1.32 2.30 5.96 
Dishonesty 0.44 0.44 0.00 1.00  0.69 0.42 0.00 1.00  0.82 0.31 0.00 1.00  0.48 0.47 0.00 1.00 
                    
Round 2                    
Actual revenue 4.53 0.91 2.74 5.89  4.09 1.24 2.15 5.93  4.22 1.25 2.04 5.95  3.76 1.10 2.07 5.77 
Dishonesty 0.36 0.47 0.00 1.00  0.59 0.47 0.00 1.00  0.67 0.45 0.00 1.00  0.78 0.39 0.00 1.00 
                    
Round 3                    
Actual revenue 3.65 1.19 2.02 5.81  3.91 1.24 2.01 5.97  4.16 1.03 2.00 5.93  3.71 0.88 2.17 4.98 
Dishonesty 0.55 0.48 0.00 1.00  0.67 0.42 0.00 1.00  0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00  0.73 0.41 0.00 1.00 
                    
Round 4                    
Actual revenue 4.07 1.18 2.09 5.84  4.14 1.33 2.07 5.98  3.80 1.20 2.24 5.72  3.67 0.97 2.18 5.80 
Dishonesty 0.55 0.51 0.00 1.00  0.53 0.48 0.00 1.00  0.86 0.32 0.00 1.00  0.73 0.40 0.00 1.00 
                    
Round 5                    
Actual revenue 4.27 1.23 2.25 5.98  4.23 1.08 2.28 6.00  3.90 1.24 2.19 5.56  3.77 1.20 2.03 5.75 
Dishonesty 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00  0.59 0.48 0.00 1.00  0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00  0.68 0.45 0.00 1.00 
                    
Round 6                    
Actual revenue 4.45 1.02 2.89 5.87  3.97 1.18 2.01 5.99  4.05 1.31 2.10 5.96  3.68 1.22 2.01 5.57 
Dishonesty 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00  0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00  0.76 0.42 0.00 1.00  0.77 0.39 0.00 1.00 
                    
This table provides summary statistics for Actual revenue and Dishonesty for each of the six rounds. The experiment had two manipulated factors: control 
centralization (Review Near / Review Far) and compensation interdependence (High CI / Low CI). Actual revenue refers to the actual revenue from a project that 
was uniformly distributed between two and six and randomly generated each round. Dishonesty is (Reported revenue – Actual revenue) / (6 – Actual revenue). It 
captures the extent to which a participant dishonestly reported, given the amount they were able to misreport.
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TABLE 5 
ANOVA Examining the Effect of Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence 
on Perceived Detection Likelihood 
 
Panel A: Average (Std. Errors) Subjective Assessment of Detection Likelihood by 
Condition 
 
 Near Review Far Review Overall 
Low CI 36.67 (5.43) 
26.96 
(4.52) 
31.81 
(3.53) 
High CI 31.11 (5.43) 
20.67 
(4.70) 
25.89 
(3.59) 
Overall 33.89 (3.84) 
23.81 
(3.26) 
 
 
   
Panel B: Main Effects   
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Compensation Interdependence 1.38 0.24 
Control Centralization (H1) 4.00 0.05 
Compensation Interdependence * Control Centralization 0.01 0.94 
   
Panel C: Simple Effects   
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Centralized Control 
0.93 0.34 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Decentralized Control 
0.52 0.47 
Effect of Centralization given Low Compensation 
Interdependence 
1.89 0.17 
Effect of Centralization given High Compensation 
Interdependence 
2.11 0.15 
 
This table provides the results of an ANOVA with perceived detection likelihood as the dependent variable and 
compensation interdependence (CI Low / CI High) and control centralization (Far Review / Near Review) as the 
independent variables. Detection Likelihood is participants’ respond to the post-experiment question: Suppose you 
were to do the same task with the same review process for six more rounds. What would you assess the likelihood to 
be that you would be selected for a review at least once in the six rounds? 
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TABLE 6 
Mixed ANOVA Examining the Effects of Control Centralization and Compensation 
Interdependence on Dishonesty 
 
Panel A: Average (Std. Errors) Dishonesty by Condition 
  
 Near Review Far Review Overall 
Low CI 0.48 (0.04) 
0.61 
(0.03) 
0.56 
(0.02) 
High CI 0.76 (0.04) 
0.70 
(0.03) 
0.72 
(0.03) 
Overall 0.62 (0.03) 
0.65 
(0.02) 
 
 
   
Panel B: Main Effects   
Source F p-value 
 (two-tailed) 
Compensation Interdependence 11.23 < 0.01 
Control Centralization 0.48 0.49 
Compensation Interdependence * Control Centralization (H2) 3.23 0.08 
   
Panel C: Repeated Measure Effects   
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Round 0.58 0.72 
Control Centralization * Round 1.00 0.42 
Compensation Interdependence * Round 0.76 0.58 
Control Centralization * Compensation Interdependence * 
Round 
1.30 0.27 
 
Panel D: Simple Effects 
  
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given Centralized 
Control 
1.45 0.23 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given Decentralized 
Control 
11.45 < 0.01 
Effect of Centralization given Low Compensation 
Interdependence 
3.16 0.08 
Effect of Centralization given High Compensation 
Interdependence 
0.60 0.44 
 
This table provides the results of a mixed ANOVA with Dishonesty as the dependent variable and compensation 
interdependence (CI Low / CI High) and control centralization (Far Review / Near Review) as the independent 
variables. I use a mixed model to correct for correlation resulting from multiple decisions from each participant. 
Dishonesty is calculated (Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue) / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue). 
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TABLE 7 
Mixed ANOVA Examining the Effect of Control Centralization and Compensation 
Interdependence on Dishonesty – Actual Revenue Control 
 
Panel A: Average (Std. Errors) Dishonesty by Condition 
 
 Near Review Far Review Overall 
Low CI 0.51 (0.03) 
0.63 
(0.03) 
0.58 
(0.02) 
High CI 0.75 (0.03) 
0.66 
(0.03) 
0.70 
(0.02) 
Overall 0.63 (0.02) 
0.64 
(0.02) 
 
 
   
Panel B: Main Effects   
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Actual Revenue 64.92 < 0.01 
Compensation Interdependence 6.86 0.01 
Control Centralization 0.05 0.82 
Compensation Interdependence * Control Centralization 3.84 0.05 
   
Panel C: Repeated Measure Effects   
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Round 0.32 0.90 
Control Centralization * Round 0.48 0.79 
Compensation Interdependence * Round 0.89 0.49 
Control Centralization * Compensation Interdependence * 
Round 
1.00 0.42 
 
Panel D: Simple Effects 
  
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Centralized Control 
0.28 0.59 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Decentralized Control 
9.10 < 0.01 
Effect of Centralization given Low Compensation 
Interdependence 
1.47 0.22 
Effect of Centralization given High Compensation 
Interdependence 
2.42 0.12 
 
This table provides the results of a mixed ANOVA with Dishonesty as the dependent variable and compensation interdependence 
(CI Low / CI High) and control centralization (Far Review / Near Review) as the independent variables. I include actual revenue 
as a covariate in the ANOVA model. I use a mixed model to correct for correlation resulting from multiple decisions from each 
participant. Dishonesty is calculated (Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue) / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue).  
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TABLE 8 
Mixed ANOVA Examining the Effect of Control Centralization and Compensation 
Interdependence on Dishonesty  
 
Panel A: Average (Std. Errors) Dishonesty by Condition 
 
 Near Review Far Review Overall 
Low CI 0.59 (0.04) 
0.70 
(0.04) 
0.65 
(0.03) 
High CI 0.79 (0.05) 
0.68 
(0.04) 
0.74 
(0.04) 
Overall 0.69 (0.03) 
0.69 
(0.03) 
 
    
 
Panel B: Main Effects   
Source F p-value 
 (two-tailed) 
Compensation Interdependence 1.87 0.17 
Control Centralization 0.02 0.99 
Compensation Interdependence * Control Centralization 2.72 0.10 
   
Panel C: Repeated Measure Effects   
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Round 1.30 0.26 
Control Centralization * Round 0.90 0.48 
Compensation Interdependence * Round 0.75 0.59 
Control Centralization * Compensation Interdependence * 
Round 
1.44 0.21 
 
Panel D: Simple Effects 
  
Source F p-value 
 (two-tailed) 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Centralized Control 
0.01 0.97 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Decentralized Control 
5.77 0.02 
Effect of Centralization given Low Compensation 
Interdependence 
1.18 0.28 
Effect of Centralization given High Compensation 
Interdependence 
2.17 0.14 
 
This table provides the results of a mixed ANOVA with Dishonesty as the dependent variable and compensation interdependence 
(CI Low / CI High) and control centralization (Far Review / Near Review) as the independent variables. I include actual revenue 
as a covariate in the ANOVA model. I use a mixed model to correct for correlation resulting from multiple decisions from each 
participant. Dishonesty is calculated (Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue) / (Max Revenue – Actual Revenue). This analysis 
excludes all observations with actual revenue < $2.50 and > $5.50  
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TABLE 9 
Mixed ANOVA Examining the Effect of Control Centralization and Compensation 
Interdependence on Overstate  
 
Panel A: Average (Std. Errors) Overstate by Condition 
 
 Near Review Far Review Overall 
Low CI 1.19 (0.12) 
1.55 
(0.10) 
1.40 
(0.08) 
High CI 1.77 (0.12) 
1.66 
(0.11) 
1.71 
(0.08) 
Overall 1.48 (0.09) 
1.61 
(0.07) 
 
    
 
   
Panel B: Main Effects   
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Compensation Interdependence 5.80 0.02 
Control Centralization 0.85 0.36 
Compensation Interdependence * Control Centralization 2.68 0.11 
   
Panel C: Repeated Measure Effects   
Source F p-value 
 (two-tailed) 
Round 0.84 0.52 
Control Centralization * Round 1.14 0.34 
Compensation Interdependence * Round 0.68 0.64 
Control Centralization * Compensation Interdependence * 
Round 
1.00 0.42 
 
Panel D: Simple Effects 
  
Source F p-value 
 (two-tailed) 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Centralized Control 
0.55 0.46 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Decentralized Control 
10.77 0.01 
Effect of Centralization given Low Compensation 
Interdependence 
5.07 0.02 
Effect of Centralization given High Compensation 
Interdependence 
0.39 0.53 
 
This table provides the results of a mixed ANOVA with Overstate as the dependent variable and compensation 
interdependence (CI Low / CI High) and control centralization (Far Review / Near Review) as the independent 
variables. I use a mixed model to correct for correlation resulting from multiple decisions from each participant. 
Overstate is calculated (Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue). 
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TABLE 10 
Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Control Centralization and Compensation 
Interdependence on Misreport  
 
Panel A: Percentage of Misreporting per opportunity by Condition 
 
 Near Review Far Review Overall 
Low CI 56/108 
51.9% 
104/156 
66.7% 
160/264 
60.6% 
High CI 86/108 
79.6% 
110/144 
76.4% 
196/252 
77.8% 
Overall 142/216 
65.7% 
214/300 
71.3% 
 
 
   
Panel B: Main Effects   
Source Z p-value 
 (two-tailed) 
Compensation Interdependence 3.24 < 0.01 
Control Centralization 1.88 0.06 
Compensation Interdependence * Control Centralization -1.61 0.11 
   
 
This table provides the results of a logistic regression with Misreport as the dependent variable and compensation 
interdependence (CI Low / CI High) and control centralization (Far Review / Near Review) as the independent 
variables. The model is estimated assuming panel-specific heteroskedastic errors to correct for correlation among 
participants. Misreport is coded one if a participant’s reported revenue was greater than actual revenue and zero 
otherwise. 
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TABLE 11 
Red Chips Drawn across Conditions and Rounds 
       
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 
Far Review 3/50 
6.0% 
6/50 
12.0% 
8/50 
16.0% 
3/50 
6.0% 
6/50 
12.0% 
4.50 
8.0% 
Near Review 4/36 
11.1% 
2/36 
5.6% 
1/36 
2.8% 
5/36 
13.9% 
1/36 
2.8% 
7/36 
19.4% 
       
Chi-Square 0.73 1.03 3.91 1.54 2.38 2.46 
Pr > Chi-Square 0.39 0.31 0.05 0.21 0.12 0.12 
 
This table provides the number of red poker chips drawn across rounds for participants in the Far Review and Near 
Review conditions. The results of an odds ratio test are provided in the bottom two lines. This examines whether the 
two percentage across the two condition significantly differs across the rounds. 
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TABLE 12 
ANOVA Examining the Effect of Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence 
on Perceived Partner’s Misreporting Norm 
 
Panel A: Average (Std. Errors) Perceived Partner’s Misreporting Norm by Condition 
 
 Near Review Far Review Overall 
Low CI -0.69 (0.30) 
0.15 
(0.25) 
-0.27 
(0.19) 
High CI 0.40 (0.30) 
0.06 
(0.26) 
0.23 
(0.20) 
Overall -0.14 (0.10) 
0.10 
(0.18) 
 
 
   
Panel B: Main Effects   
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Compensation Interdependence 3.37 0.07 
Control Centralization 0.81 0.37 
Compensation Interdependence * Control Centralization 4.70 0.03 
   
Panel C: Simple Effects   
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Centralized Control 
0.07 0.80 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Decentralized Control 
6.90 0.01 
Effect of Centralization given Low Compensation 
Interdependence 
4.78 0.03 
Effect of Centralization given High Compensation 
Interdependence 
0.79 0.38 
 
This table provides the results of an ANOVA with perceived partner’s misreporting norm as the dependent variable 
and compensation interdependence (CI Low / CI High) and control centralization (Far Review / Near Review) as the 
independent variables. Perceived partner’s misreporting norm is participants’ respond to the two post-experiment 
questions: (1) In how many rounds do you think your partner overstated his or her revenue? (2) Across all rounds, 
by how much do you think your partner overstated his or her revenue? I run a principal component analysis on the 
responses to these two questions. Higher scores indicate a higher perception that a participant’s partner overstated 
his or her revenue.  
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TABLE 13 
ANOVA Examining the Effect of Control Centralization and Compensation Interdependence 
on Perceived Other Participant’s Misreporting Norm 
 
Panel A: Average (Std. Errors) Perceived Other Participant’s Misreporting Norm by 
Condition 
 
 Near Review Far Review Overall 
Low CI -0.49 (0.30) 
0.12 
(0.25) 
-0.18 
(0.19) 
High CI -0.15 (0.30) 
0.35 
(0.26) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
Overall -0.32 (0.21) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
 
 
   
Panel B: Main Effects   
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Compensation Interdependence 1.06 0.31 
Control Centralization 4.09 0.05 
Compensation Interdependence * Control Centralization 0.04 0.84 
   
Panel C: Simple Effects   
Source F p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Centralized Control 
0.41 0.52 
Effect of Compensation Interdependence given 
Decentralized Control 
0.65 0.42 
Effect of Centralization given Low Compensation 
Interdependence 
2.52 0.12 
Effect of Centralization given High Compensation 
Interdependence 
1.63 0.21 
 
This table provides the results of an ANOVA with perceived other participant’s misreporting norm as the dependent 
variable and compensation interdependence (CI Low / CI High) and control centralization (Far Review / Near 
Review) as the independent variables. Perceived other participant’s misreporting norm is participants’ responses to 
the two post-experiment questions: (1) In how many rounds do you think an average participant in this session 
overstated his or her revenue? (2) Across all rounds, by how much do you think an average participant overstated 
his or her revenue? I run a principal component analysis on the responses to these two questions. Higher scores 
indicate a higher perception that a participant’s partner overstated his or her revenue. The instructions specifically 
indicated that “an average participant” does not include their partner.  
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TABLE 14 
Descriptive Statistics by Within Manipulation Conditions 
 
 Control Design    
 
Review Near First  
(Rounds 1-3)  
Review Near First  
(Rounds 4-6)  TOTAL 
 n = 8; obs = 24  n = 8; obs = 24  n = 16; obs = 48 
 Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
Actual Revenue 4.16 1.13 2.01 5.84  4.15 1.00 2.15 5.54  4.16 1.06 2.01 5.84 
Reported Revenue 5.71 0.49 4.45 6.00  5.84 0.35 4.83 6.00  5.78 0.43 4.45 6.00 
Overstate 1.55 1.22 0.00 3.99  1.69 1.06 0.00 3.70  1.62 1.14 0.00 3.99 
Dishonesty 0.74 0.38 0.00 1.00  0.89 0.28 0.00 1.00  0.81 0.34 0.00 1.00 
               
 
Review Far First  
(Rounds 1-3)  
Review Far First  
(Rounds 4-6)  TOTAL 
 n = 8; obs = 24  n = 8; obs = 24   n = 8; obs = 24 
 Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
Actual Revenue 4.04 1.03 2.18 5.93  3.99 1.13 2.10 5.79  4.01 1.07 2.10 5.93 
Reported Revenue 5.50 0.88 3.00 6.00  5.88 0.29 4.85 6.00  5.69 0.67 3.00 6.00 
Overstate 1.46 1.16 0.00 3.69  1.89 1.29 0.00 3.89  1.68 1.23 0.00 3.89 
Dishonesty 0.75 0.37 0.00 1.00  0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00  0.77 0.39 0.00 1.00 
               
               
 
This table provides summary statistics for the within-subjects manipulation of control design. The top (bottom) three quadrants contain summary statistics for the 
condition where the control was first centralized (decentralized) and then decentralized (centralized). Participants completed the task for six rounds with the 
manipulation coming after the third round. As such, n refers to the number of participants and obs refers to the number of observation taking into account 
multiple observations for a single participant. Actual Revenue refers to the actual revenue generated from a project that was uniformly distributed between 2 and 
6 and was randomly selected each round. Reported Revenue is the amount the participant elected to report the project generated each round. It was bounded 
between the Actual Revenue and 6. Overstate is Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue. Dishonesty is Overstate / (6 – Actual Revenue) and captures the extent to 
which a participant dishonestly reported given the amount they were able to misreport
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 TABLE 15 
Mean (Std. Deviation) of Variables across Rounds in Within Conditions 
 
Near Review First 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 
Actual Revenue 
4.05 
(1.33) 
4.27 
(0.76) 
4.17 
(1.36) 
3.61 
(1.07) 
4.36 
(0.82) 
4.48 
(0.98) 
Reported Revenue 
5.55 
(0.63) 
5.72 
(0.50) 
5.87 
(0.30) 
5.82 
(0.32) 
5.83 
(0.41) 
5.86 
(0.37) 
Overstate 
1.50 
(1.36) 
1.45 
(0.99) 
1.70 
(1.43) 
2.21 
(1.00) 
1.48 
(1.01) 
1.38 
(1.11) 
Dishonesty 
0.64 
(0.43) 
0.77 
(0.37) 
0.81 
(0.37) 
0.93 
(0.12) 
0.86 
(0.35) 
0.87 
(0.35) 
 
Far Review First 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 
Actual Revenue 
3.77 
(1.21) 
4.53 
(0.70) 
3.84 
(1.06) 
4.23 
(1.34) 
3.60 
(1.20) 
4.13 
(0.81) 
Reported Revenue 
5.19 
(0.97) 
5.76 
(0.54) 
5.56 
(1.05) 
5.75 
(0.42) 
5.97 
(0.07) 
5.91 
(0.24) 
Overstate 
1.42 
(1.45) 
1.23 
(0.87) 
1.72 
(1.20) 
1.52 
(1.57) 
2.38 
(1.26) 
1.78 
(0.97) 
Dishonesty 
0.58 
(0.40) 
0.82 
(0.34) 
0.85 
(0.35) 
0.62 
(0.52) 
0.87 
(0.35) 
0.87 
(0.35) 
 
This table provides summary statistics for the within-subjects manipulation of control design. The top (bottom) 
portion of the table contain summary statistics for the condition where the control was first centralized 
(decentralized) and then decentralized (centralized). Participants completed the task for six rounds with the 
manipulation coming after the third round. Actual Revenue refers to the actual revenue generated from a project that 
was uniformly distributed between 2 and 6 and was randomly selected each round. Reported Revenue is the amount 
the participant elected to report the project generated each round. It was bounded between the Actual Revenue and 6. 
Overstate is Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue. Dishonesty is Overstate / (6 – Actual Revenue) and captures the 
extent to which a participant dishonestly reported given the amount they were able to misreport.
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TABLE 16 
Mean (Std. Deviation) of Variables across Rounds in Within Conditions 
 
PANEL A: High CI Condition 
Near Review First 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 
Dishonesty 0.59 0.79 0.75 0.94 0.81 0.83 
       
Far Review First 
Dishonesty 0.49 0.70 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 
 
PANEL B: Low CI Condition 
Near Review First 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 
Dishonesty 0.78 0.72 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 
       
Far Review First 
Dishonesty 0.67 0.94 0.95 0.50 1.00 1.00 
 
This table provides Average Dishonesty for the within-subjects manipulation of control design. Panel A provides 
average dishonesty for each round for participants in the High CI condition. Panel B provides average dishonesty for 
each round for participants in the Low CI condition. Participants completed the task for six rounds with the 
manipulation coming after the third round. Dishonesty is (Reported Revenue – Actual Revenue) / (6 – Actual 
Revenue) and captures the extent to which a participant dishonestly reported given the amount they were able to 
misreport 
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